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ABSTRACT 
President Bush established United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) in 
February 2007, which was commissioned fully operational on 1 October 2008.  
AFRICOM was established to increase DoD’s efficiency and effectiveness for African 
operations and exercises and merged the responsibilities for the African continent into a 
single command in order to foresee and prevent crises in Africa that could threaten U.S. 
strategic interests.  This merger joined responsibilities previously spread amongst the 
authorities of United States European Command (EUCOM), United States Central 
Command (CENTCOM), and United States Pacific Command (PACOM). AFRICOM’s 
location discussion has centered on access to the continent and minimized other 
important considerations, such as access to the USG and policy development; supporting 
infrastructure, and the stability of where it will operate.  A location decision is a complex 
decision; one that has long-term impact and therefore requires systematic analysis to 
make the process effective, efficient, and apolitical.  This thesis follows several recent 
military efforts that utilize the business sector and associated applications to improve the 
decision effectiveness and efficiency.  Specifically, it applies the Analytical Hierarchy 
Process (AHP) to the AFRICOM strategic headquarters location decision to provide a 
balanced, effective, and efficient review. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PURPOSE   
Since the end of colonialism in Africa in the 1960s, United States foreign policy 
has relegated Africa to a lower level of importance than other regions and Department of 
Defense (DoD) priorities have reflected this.  However, Africa has recently risen in 
strategic significance for several reasons, including terrorist threats, disease proliferation, 
and significant energy resources.  As a result, President Bush established United States 
Africa Command (AFRICOM) in February 2007, which was commissioned fully 
operational on 1 October 2008.  AFRICOM was established to increase DoD’s efficiency 
and effectiveness for African operations and exercises and merged the responsibilities for 
the African continent into a single command in order to foresee and prevent crises in 
Africa that could threaten U.S. strategic interests.  This merger joined responsibilities 
previously spread amongst the authorities of United States European Command 
(EUCOM), United States Central Command (CENTCOM), and United States Pacific 
Command (PACOM).  In addition, DoD seeks to better integrate with other U.S. 
Agencies, such as the United States Department of State (DOS) and United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID).   
The decision to locate the interagency command on the continent was first 
announced in February 2007 and was met with significant resistance from African 
governments, international governmental organizations and nations, and non-
governmental organizations.  Locating AFRICOM in Africa would be the first such 
posting of a unified combatant command (UCC) overseas during peacetime, where the 
nation is not actively (i.e., kinetically) fighting or defending U.S. interests in its intended 
Area of Responsibility (AOR).  Only two UCCs have resided on foreign soil, and in both 
instances they were established as a result of armed intervention in the respective regions.  
First, United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) was officially established in 
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Panama in 19471 largely as a result of the need to defend the Panama Canal, and was 
moved to Miami, Florida in the late 1990s.  Second, EUCOM was established in 
Germany to help rebuild the country during the aftermath of World War II and remains 
there to this day.  In the face of resistance from African states, the decision has been 
taken to keep AFRICOM in Stuttgart, Germany for the time being.  With diplomatic 
tussles over the location issue at the forefront, the costs and benefits associated with 
different location options have not been fully addressed.  What location would maximize 
the U.S. Government’s ability to successfully develop, promote, and execute coherent 
and consistent policy objectives with respect to African security and development?  To 
address this question, one must weigh the variety of factors that have impact on a 
combatant command and its ability to support its mission.    
B. IMPORTANCE 
Since the National Security Act of 1947 established the Unified Command Plan 
(UCP) which directs the combatant command structure there have been numerous 
changes made intended to increase its efficiencies and effectiveness.  Many of these 
modifications dealt with overlaps in geographical or functional areas.  Generally 
speaking, strategic commands create plans that aim to achieve long term objectives.  
Inherent in these plans is the need for leadership and operations to have access and reach 
to successfully engage at all required levels in support of directed objectives.  Material 
requirements include, but are not limited to: air, land, and sea transport; and local 
infrastructure to support the staff, planners, and operators such as utilities, office space, 
and security.  Political requirements are the procedural, legal, and relationship factors that 
may preclude reaching the objectives (e.g., sovereign government and non-governmental 
organization support and popular local support).  Balancing these two requirements will 
provide the most complete assessment of alternative basing locations and ensure all 
considerations are weighed and weighted in support of strategic objectives.  Establishing 
                                                 
1 SOUTHCOM has a history that dates back to 1905 when U.S. Forces were first put in place to secure 
the Panama Canal due to its strategic importance. 
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a strategic headquarters requires that this process be thorough, calculated, and lends itself 
to providing capable, consistent, and uninterrupted support to the operators.  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW  
1. Survey of Prior Work    
AFRICOM provides a dedicated, focused organization to monitor African crises 
and operations through an integrated interagency command initially that DoD planned to 
be located on the continent as stated by Ms. Theresa Whelan, Deputy Assistant Secretary 
of Defense African Affairs.2  These operations will include support to many on-going 
initiatives to include the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), Millennium 
Challenge Account (MCA), several counterterrorism (CT) programs, and the African 
Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA); all of which will require 
direct interaction at an operational and tactical level in-country.  AFRICOM’s stated 
mission is:  
United States Africa Command, in concert with other U.S. government 
agencies and international partners, conducts sustained security 
engagement through military to military programs, military sponsored 
activities, and other military operations as directed to promote a stable and 
secure African environment in support of U.S. foreign policy.3 
Initial official statements implied that the command could not meet these objectives 
unless it is located on the continent.4  The later decision to keep the command in Stuttgart 
after African governments resisted a continental headquarters did not include a change of 
position on the relationship between location and ability to meet objectives.  Rather, 
                                                 
2 Theresa Whelan,  “Transcript: U.S. to Establish New U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM),” 
(Washington Foreign Press Center, 7 February 2007); Walter L. Sharp,  “DoD News Briefing with Mr. 
Henry and Lt. Gen Sharp from the Pentagon,” United States Department of Defense, 7 February 2007, 
www.eucom.mil (accessed 12 June 2007); William E. Ward,  “General William ‘Kip’ Ward (USA) is 
Interviewed on PBS’s ‘The Charlie Rose Show,’” interview by Charlie Rose (PBS, 14 November 2007).   
3 William E. Ward,  “USAFRICOM Briefing,” 30 April 2008, 
http://www.africom.mil/pdfFiles/AFRICOM_Deputies_Cmb_Brf_Industry_Day_2008_04_30.pdf accessed 
19 October 2008).  
4 Whelan,  “U.S. to Establish New U.S. Africa Command,” 2007. Ward,  “USAFRICOM: About 
Africom,”   http://www.africom.mil/AboutAFRICOM.asp (accessed 11 January 2008). 
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AFRICOM will continue a  “multiyear process “ of deliberation with African partners, 
which it still hopes will end with a headquarters on the continent.5 
One of the primary reasons given by the Department of Defense for the 
conclusion that AFRICOM’s success depends on an African continental location is that it 
needs to be there to gain greater understanding of African culture (or cultures), and to 
have access to its intended partners in order to enable the U.S. government, businesses, 
and other supporting organizations to focus on acceptable and complimentary roles in 
establishing peace and security in Africa.6   As time progressed and more African 
governments resisted the idea of having a U.S. military command located on the 
continent through public statements and deliberations, the high political costs of a 
forward location became more evident and Stuttgart, Germany became a more attractive 
location for the short term.  The already existing headquarters type infrastructure 
available there required only minor modifications; Germany is secure; and it has great 
access to transportation.  Still, it remains a temporary headquarters until 2012 when the 
final location decision is expected.7 
Critics of AFRICOM fall into two camps: those who believe the command is 
entirely unnecessary, counterproductive, or will militarize the continent yet again; and 
those who support the creation of the command but believe that it should not be located 
in Africa.  Both arguments focus on the potential political impacts.  The first group 
consists mainly of academics and policy analysts who argue that U.S. interests in oil and 
terrorism are largely inconsistent with the interests of the African countries and that 
                                                 
5 AFRICOM FAQs,  “Questions and Answers about AFRICOM,”  
http://www.africom.mil/africomFAQs.asp (accessed 19 October 2008); Ward,  “USAFRICOM: About 
Africom.”  
6 Ward,  “The Charlie Rose Show.”  “Questions and Answers about AFRICOM.”  
7 John Vandiver,  “AFRICOM to Remain in Stuttgart until 2012,” Stars and Stripes: Mideast Edition, 
1 November 2008, www.stripes.com (accessed 2 February 2009). 
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AFRICOM will likely result in a negative impact on Africa. 8  One such fierce critic goes 
so far as to liken any presence to the Christian Crusades.9   The criticisms focus mainly 
on a view that the U.S. desires to control the flow of African oil, which in turn is fueling 
a militarization of Africa via AFRICOM in general and its forward location in 
particular.10  This camp often argues that U.S. counterterrorism initiatives are intended to 
establish a military presence in the region that will ultimately be used to secure smooth 
flowing oil.11  A small element within this group even suggests that the U.S. masks its 
strategic interest in oil in ostensible humanitarian initiatives such as conflict resolution in 
Darfur and support for HIV/AIDS relief.12  They state that the U.S. promises a great deal 
on the humanitarian stage, yet delivers little, while at the same time increasing military 
engagement in the region and demonstrating imperialist tendencies.  From their 
perspective, AFRICOM’s presence on the continent supports misguided U.S. policy 
objectives. 
The second camp of critics focuses specifically on the location issue.  
AFRICOM’s location has been a point of contention since the February 2007 
announcement when initial statements indicated that the command must be on the 
continent for purposes of engagement.13  This camp is made up largely of African 
                                                 
8 Jeremy Keenan,  “Terror in the Sahara: the Implications of US Imperialism for North & West 
Africa,” Review of African Political Economy, No 101, 2004, 478; David Gutelius,  “US Creates African 
Enemies Where None were Before,” Christian Science Monitor, July 11, 2003, 11;  “Commentary 
Questions US Approach to fighting Terrorism in Africa,” 10 September 2005, translated by FBIS, 
www.opensource.gov AFP20050914623002 (accessed 25 May 2006); Jason Motlagh,  “US opens new war 
front in North Africa,” Asia Times Online, 14 June 2006, accessed at 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Front_Page/HF14Aa01.thml on 7 July 2006;  David Gutelius,  “War on 
Terror and Social Networks,” Islam, Society & the State Review 17, Spring 2006, 39. 
9 Gutelius,  “War on Terror and Social Networks,” 39. 
10 Michael T. Klare and Daniel Volman,  “Africa’s Oil and American National Security,” Current 
History, May 2004; Cyril Obi,  “Oil, US Global Strategy and the Challenge of Development in West 
Africa,” CODESRIA Bulletin Nos. 3 & 4, 2005, 38-41; Salih Booker and Ann-Louise Colgan,  “Africa 
Policy Outlook 2006,” Foreign Policy in Focus, 16 March 2006, http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/3157 (accessed 
7 May 2006); B Real,  “Understanding AFRICOM: A Contextual Reading of Empire’s New Combatant 
Command,” Moon of Alabama, February 2007, 
http://www.moonofalabama.org/images/understandingAFRICOM-bReal.pdf (accessed 26 June 2007). 
11 Jim Lobe,  “Group Slams Janus Face of U.S. Policy,” Inter Press Service News Agency, 9 March 
2006, http://www.ipsnews.net/africa/nota.asp?idnews=32447 (accessed 7 May 2006); Klare and Volman, 
227-228. 
12 Booker and Colgan,  “Africa Policy Outlook.” 
13 Whelan,  “U.S. to Establish New Africa Command.” 
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governments, including those in Nigeria, Ethiopia, South Africa, Morocco, Ghana, 
among a host of others.14  Then, South African Defense Minister Mosiuoa Lekota said 
before AFRICOM was established as a sub-unified command that it  “should stay out of 
the African continent.”15 For these governments locating AFRICOM on the continent 
suggests a U.S. desire to gain a military foothold in the region for the purposes of 
controlling oil and countering terrorism operations.16  However, most of the governments 
do support AFRICOM’s focused and consolidated security assistance efforts.17  Thus, 
one can infer an acceptance of AFRICOM as a step forward, as long as it is located 
outside the continent.   
This situation creates a conundrum.  AFRICOM leaders believe that they must 
have a forward location to be effective, while potential hosts find the command 
threatening only if it is forward located.  While AFRICOM leaders seemed puzzled by 
the response from African governments, the location or relocation of previous UCCs met 
with similar support and criticisms.18  More importantly, while logic of the preference for 
forward location is sound, there is no evidence that it is supported by a systematic cost-
benefit analysis.   
In the broader literature on command location, supporters of a  “within the AOR 
location “ focus on the access that a forward located command have to its intended 
                                                 
14 Deane-Peter Baker,  “The Americans Are Already Here,” Institute for Security Studies, 16 August 
07, www.iss.org.za (accessed 16 November 2007);  Jonathan Paye-Layeleh,  “West African Military Chiefs 
Denounce Africom,” Mail & Guardian Online, 7 November 2007, www.mg.co.za  (accessed 16 November 
2007).  
15  “Lekota: Africom Should Stay Off The Continent,” Mail & Guardian Online, 29 August 2007, 
www.mg.co.za (accessed 16 November 2007). 
16 Daniel Gordon,  “The Controversy over Africom,” BBC Online, 3 October 2007; Associated Press,  
“US AFRICOM Headquarters to remain in Germany for  “Foreseeable Future,” International Herald 
Tribune, 19 February 2008, at http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2008/02/19/africa/AF-GEN-US-Africa-
Command.php (accessed 1 March 2009); Paye-Laylah. 
17  “Africom Should Stay Off the Continent.”  
18 Paul De La Garza,  “Zinni: CentCom Should Stay Put,” St. Petersburg Times, 22 September 2002, 
at http://billnelson.senate.gov/news/details.cfm?id=244591&  (accessed 12 September 2006); J.T. Ward,  
“Puerto Rican Group Says No to SouthCom,” St. Petersburg Times, 29 March 1995, 5B; John Otis,  
“Panamanians Seek Pact Change to Maintain U.S. Bases,” The Washington Times, Part A, WORLD, 5 
September 1995, A11. 
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partner nation, geographical and cultural.19   They also believe that forward location 
demonstrates commitment to the region as well as better integrating planning and 
command over subordinates.20  Supporters of an  “outside the AOR “ location focus on 
requirements for the smooth function of the command and interaction between the 
command and the effectiveness and subordination of planners and commanders in 
supporting policies as directed by Washington, DC.  Zink argues that forward based 
personnel often implement operations and decisions in a manner that does not support 
administration policies as developed at higher levels of government.21  For the most 
recent combatant command location decision, SOUTHCOM’s move in 1997, a 1995 
House Armed Services Committee hearing concluded that, while forward presence 
provides great convenience for military security assistance, the command’s forward 
presence was not vital and potentially inhibited the growth of governance.22  
2.   Major Questions and Arguments   
This thesis argues that the best location is dependent on the consideration of all 
criteria that support the strategic requirements for a command to achieve its support of 
USG objectives.  AFRICOM’s location discussion has centered on access to the continent 
and minimized other important considerations, such as access to the USG and policy 
development; supporting infrastructure, and the stability of where it will operate.  A 
location decision is a complex decision; one that has long term impact and therefore 
requires systematic analysis to make the process effective, efficient, and apolitical.  The 
decision concerning AFRICOM’s location is similar to that taken on the relocation of 
SOUTHCOM in 1997.  Where best to establish the command to maximize the tools with 
which to most efficiently and effectively execute its strategic mission?  In the case of 
                                                 
19 Charles Wilhelm,  “The Jane’s Interview,” Interview by Bryan Bender, Jane’s Defence Weekly, Vol 
030, Iss 024, 16 December 1998. 
20 Richard M. Leighton,  “Allied Unity of Command in the Second World War: A Study in Regional 
Military Organization,” Political Science Quarterly 67, No 3, September 1952, 401; Harold Zink,  
“American Military Government Organization in Germany,” The Journal of Politics 8, No 3, August 1946, 
329-349.  
21 Zink,  “American Military Government Organization,” 330-332. 
22 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on 
Western Hemisphere,  “U.S. Strategic Interests in Panama” (Washington, 9 March 1995), 58-61. 
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SOUTHCOM, a balance of geographical, cultural, and access concerns was struck.  
SOUTHCOM’s location was ultimately based on a consideration of the benefits and costs 
(both material and political) associated with alternative locations, including access, 
available infrastructure, political issues (e.g., local support, cultural reach), and operating 
costs.23    The process was long and political.  It took nearly seven years, a hundred 
locations, and ultimately involved a team engaging with five finalist cities vying for the 
command.  Once the decision was made, it took nearly two and a half years to affect the 
move.  The final result was relocation to the most well rounded locale, Miami.  This was 
not a forgone conclusion and the command could have been located in a city that did not 
offer the optimum balance of access and infrastructure to meet its operating requirements.   
Since that time, the Department of Defense has become more willing to expand 
doctrine to include business type models in making complicated decisions.  These include 
the mid-1990’s Navy adaptation of Total Quality Leadership which modeled the business 
world’s Total Quality Management and Secretary Donald Rumsfield’s initiative to 
privatize and contract out various aspects of defense services such as base security and 
cleaning and landscaping in order to save money and increase the operational aspects of 
the services.  Therefore, the use of business models to assess the effect of location on 
efficiency and effectiveness is consistent with previous DoD approaches and a parallel 
can be drawn between the two.  DoD has stated that AFRICOM will use a holistic 
government approach to its staff structure and mission objectives.  Several authors 
identify a holistic approach in determining the location of a strategic headquarters.  They 
argue that the decision making process must include a quantitative and qualitative 
analysis in order to ensure consideration of all applicable factors surrounding a specific 
location.24  Thus, this thesis adopts the Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP), which has 
been used to select business headquarters locations, to the question of strategic location 
                                                 
23 Charles D. Sykora,  “Has the Time Come to Merge Southcom with Another Unified Command?” 
18 May 2004, 10, 21. 
24 Linda G.Tresslar,  “Putting the Location Decision into a Business Context,” Area Development 
Online: Site and Facility Planning, 
http://www.areadevelopment.com/siteSelection/nov06/locationDecision.shtml November 2006 accessed 28 
October 2007); Jiaqin Yang and Huel Lee,  “An AHP Decision Model for Facility Location Selection,” 
Facilities 15, No 9/10 (September/October 1997), 241-254. 
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for military commands.25  Ultimately,  “decision makers must select sites that will not 
simply perform well according to the current system state, but that will continue to be 
profitable for the facility’s lifetime… “26  In other words, strategic headquarters must be 
positioned in the most appropriate position possible at their inception. 
D.   METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES  
The AHP model is first adapted to command requirements and then applied to 
SOUTHCOM location decisions in 1947 and 1997 to test its validity.  AFRICOM has the 
stated mission to support U.S. foreign policy in concert with other U.S. government 
agencies and international partners in the area of military-to-military security assistance 
programs and operations.27  This is similar to mission statements and goals evinced by 
SOUTHCOM that have small sized U.S. military forces supporting USG strategic 
objectives focused on enhancing security and stability in the Western Hemisphere.28   
Based on its demonstrated performance in selecting a good location for SOUTHCOM, 
the model is then employed to recommend AFRICOM locations.  The thesis uses mostly 








                                                 
25 Yang and Lee,  “AHP Decision Model,” 242-244. 
26 Susan Hesse Owen & Mark S. Daskin,  “Strategic Facility Location: A Review,” European Journal 
of Operational Research 111, 1998, 423. 
27 Ward,  “USAFRICOM Briefing.”   
28 James Stavridis, U.S. House and Senate Armed Services Committee,  “The Posture Statement of 
Admiral James Stavridis, United States Navy, Commander United States Southern Command Before the 
110th Congress,” 2008, 7-19.  
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II. SETTING THE TONE: STRATEGIC LOCATION IS 
STRATEGIC LOCATION 
A. DISSECTING THE BUSINESS APPROACH 
Companies have many options to consider when they must decide where to locate 
main office and headquarters facilities - nearest to the market; within close proximity to 
resources; nearest to inexpensive labor; or somewhere in between.  It is extremely 
important to select the best possible location, one that minimizes costs while maximizing 
benefits to achieve the company’s goals while maintaining its fiscal health.  Choosing a 
strategic location for a new combatant command involves many of the same risks and 
opportunities, plus the greater risk of potential loss of life if serious mistakes are made in 
the location decision.  In both sectors,  “unless the strategic context for why a company 
[or command] chooses to be there in the first place is incorporated into the site selection 
process, the final decision cannot effectively satisfy the location attributes that will lead 
to business [or military] success.”29  This thesis uses the Analytical Hierarchy Process 
(AHP) business model, as applied to location decisions by Yang and Lee, because it is 
the most comprehensive, procedural, and detailed model available.30   
This chapter will begin by describing the model as it is applied to the business 
sector, and then proceed to reorient it for application to combatant command location 
decisions. The AHP is designed to simplify highly complex decisions.  It has been 
successfully used to determine choices in a variety of problems such as organizational 
research planning, marketing, finance, education and a host of others.  In the 1990s, it 
gained prominence as a tool to aid in the determination of facility location and relocation 
decisions.  It is a mathematical model utilizing qualitative and quantitative analysis 
techniques to break complex variables into basic components for ease of evaluation.31   
                                                 
29 Tresslar,  “Putting the Location Decision into a Business Context.” 
30 Other options considered the general, phased approach cited by Tresslar and Feemster in the 
website Area Development Online. 
31 Yang and Lee,  “AHP Decision Model,” 242, 245. 
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Yang and Lee make four initial assumptions that significantly affect planning 
efforts: a new facility location is justified and adequate resources are available for the 
complex decision process; decision makers (DM) understand the issues surrounding the 
geographical options; DMs understand the operational characteristics and location 
variables required to align the final location with the company’s objectives; and the DMs 
will make inputs into the solution process.32   The process to determine the relevant 
operational characteristics and location variables is an iterative one.  Typically, the 
analysts provide their assessments to the DM for concurrence and/or further guidance 
before finalizing the parameters of the model that will identify the optimal location.  
Miscalculations can occur when DMs pre-determine the location prior to thorough 
consideration of all the appropriate variables or when making subjective assumptions.  
Utilizing AHP makes the process objective by ensuring all factors are included in the 
process.   
Yang and Lee identify several categories of factors to be considered in the 
decision making process (Table 1).33  These are not entirely fixed, because each business 
will have slightly different location criteria, but rather serve as a starting point from 
which to define more specific criteria for a specific location decision.34  Bolded items 
indicate a factor that has applicability in the military model.  These factors may not 
transfer exactly, such as access to markets/distribution centers will be addressed as 
strategic access. 
                                                 
32 Yang and Lee,  “AHP Decision Model,” 248. 
33 Yang and Lee,  “AHP Decision Model,” 244. 
34 For example, if a business is primarily a manufacturer it will likely require a location close to raw 
materials and inexpensive labor.  If it is a service oriented industry such as tourism, it may consider the 
esthetics, remoteness, and/or activities of the surrounding area and community as a priority based on the 
need to attract tourists.  If the business is a high-tech development business, it may choose to be close to 
leading universities and areas of highly-skilled workers.   
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Factor Category Specific Factor 
Access to markets/ 
distribution centers 
- Cost of serving markets 
- Trends in sales by area 
- Ability to penetrate local markets by plant presences 
Access to supplies/ 
resources 
- Transportation costs 
- Trends to supplier in area 
Community/ government 
access 
- Ambience/ Cost of living 
- Cooperation with established local industry 
- Community Pride 
- Housing/churches 
- Schools and colleges 
Competitive 
considerations 
- Location of competitors 
- Likely reaction to new site 
Environmental factors - Community Attitude 
- State/local Government regulations 
Labor - Prevailing wage rates 
- Extent and militancy of unions in the area 
- Productivity 
- Availability 
- Skill levels Available 
Taxes and Financing - State income tax /local priority and income taxes 
- Unemployment an compensation premiums 
- Tax incentive concessions 
- Industrial pollution control revenue board 
Transportation - Trucking Svc 
- Rail Service 
- Air Service 
Utilities Service - Quality and prices of water and sewage 
- Availability and price of electric and natural gas 
- Quality of police, fire, and medical services 
Table 1.   AHP Criteria35 
                                                 
35 Yang and Lee,  “AHP Decision Model,” 244.  
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There are three major steps in the AHP solution process. 
Problem decomposition involves identifying pertinent factors to the specific 
relocation decision and organizing these into a hierarchy.   
Comparative analysis involves the relative importance of each element at a 
particular level by a procedure of pairwise comparison after the decision makers 
have provided a general prioritization of elements. 
Synthesis of priorities involves establishing priority weights of elements at each 
level using eigenvector or least square analysis methods to produce overall 
composite weights.36 
 
These three major steps are further broken down as indicated in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1.   Combined solution process of the AHP Location Model37 
                                                 
36 Yang and Lee,  “AHP Decision Model,” 246.  Eigenvector analysis utilizes matrix algebra to 
mathematically compare relationships between a series of values.  It consists of a vector (eigenvector) and 
an eigenvalue or weight for the purposes of this paper. 
37 Yang and Lee,  “AHP Decision Model,” 246-247. 
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Problem decomposition begins with a company’s decision to establish or relocate 
its headquarters (step 0).  An initial review of the company’s objectives leads to the 
development of a list of pertinent factors.  Yang and Lee’s AHP location example 
imagines that a company has chosen to establish a location to increase its access to a new 
market.  The leadership and analysis team have identified four factors and sub-factors 
they determine as the most important to achieving this goal: access to the market, 
transportation, availability of labor, and local community concerns such as housing and 
infrastructure support (Step 1).  Figure 2 shows the hierarchy of the factors developed in 
the example, and indicates whether the site-specific data is quantifiable (Yes [Y] or No 
[N]).  For convenience, A will represent Market in the coming tables and its sub-factors 
will be represented by A1, A2, and A3 in order in Figure 2, followed by B, C, and D.   
      
Figure 2.   Hierarchical Representation of Location Factors38 
Determining the weight of each factor and sub-factor has two elements (Step 2, 
Figure 1).  First, the factors are rated through a pairwise comparison at each level (i.e., 
market, transportation, labor, and community will be compared against each other while 
sub-factors such as housing, education, and business climate will be compared against 
each other within their parent factor).  Table 2 provides rating definitions used during 
                                                 
38 Yang and Lee,  “AHP Decision Model,” 249. 
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pairwise comparisons in the AHP to identify relative intensities between two items.  It 
identifies the importance of factors and sub-factors by comparing one against the other 
using the explanations below. It is important to start with the definition first because the 
process does not indicate that assigning factor X a value of 5 over factor Y means that it 
is 5 times as important, but that X is of strong importance over Y.  Even values provide 
for greater precision and stand for intermediate levels of importance between the bounded 
intensities.  The table utilizes the values as determined in original AHP analyses. 39   
Second, the associated intensity of importance will then be input into an N by N matrix 
(Table 6), where it is used to determine the relative weight after all pairwise comparisons 
have been made. 40   This process, a qualitative analysis leading to a quantitative value, is 




1 Equal Importance Two activities contribute equally to the objective 
2 Weak  
3 Moderate Importance Experience and judgment slightly favor one activity over another 
4 Moderate Plus  
5 Strong Importance Experience and judgment strongly favor one activity over another 
6 Strong Plus  
7 Very Strong Importance An activity is favored very strongly over another; its dominance 
demonstrated in practice 
8 Very, very strong  
9 Extreme Importance The evidence favoring one activity over another is of the highest 
order of affirmation 
Table 2.   Rating Scale41 
                                                 
39 Angelis Tsagdis,  “The Use of Analytical Hierarchy Process as a Source Selection Methodology 
and Its Potential Application within the Hellenic Air Force,” (M.B.A. Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 
Monterey, CA, June 2008), 18. 
40 Pairwise comparison is a head to head comparison of all qualitative elements (in this case factors 
and sub-factors) in a given problem.  The weights will be calculated using a matrix that shows all head to 
head comparisons.  Calculations used the AHP Calculation Software by CGI at http://www.isc.senshu-
u.ac.jp/~thc0456/EAHP/AHPweb.html. 
41 Tsagdis,  “The Use of Analytical Hierarchy Process,” 18. 
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Table 3 below shows a hypothetical weighting of factors A, B, C and D.  Factors 
will be compared along the horizontal; an integer value indicates the row heading is of 
greater importance than the column whereas a fraction value indicates the column is more 
important.  (Note: the reciprocal value will be automatically filled in the reciprocal cell.) 
By definition, A vs. A is equal to itself. A vs. B shows an integer value that indicates A is 
weakly more important than B.  Yet A vs. D shows a value of 1/8 of D indicating D is 
very, very strongly more important than A.  The final column indicates the Factor Weight 
for a given element (A, B, C, or D) across its hierarchical level.  This factor weighted 
value will be carried forward for use in determining the composite weights.  The same 
process applies to the sub-factors in order to determine their weights.  Table 6 shows a 
similar comparison and evaluates the Community sub-factors.  Both factor (Table 3) and 
sub-factor weights (Table 4) have been carried forward to Table 5 and combined to 
determine the overall weightings for use with specific site data values.  Finally, 
composite weights are calculated by multiplying the weighted value of each factor by its 
specific sub-factor weights.  Note that specific examples for sub-factors in A, B, and C 
have been calculated in similar fashion to those for D1 to D3 and are presented to show 
the final composite weight table in its entirety.  Once the composite weights are 
calculated, specific site evaluations may commence (Step 3, Figure 1).  Table 5 displays 
the composite weights in the example under discussion. 
 A B C D Factor Weight 
A 1 2 1/3 1/8 0.0639 
B 1/2 1 1/2 5 0.3817 
C 3 2 1 1/4 0.1427 
D 8 1/5 4 1 0.4115 
Table 3.   Location Factor Weights42 
                                                 
42 Yang and Lee,  “AHP Decision Model,” 253.  In all tables, an item evaluated against itself always 
has a value of 1.  The process compares factors horizontally across the matrix.  Category B is seen as 
weakly more important than A, C is moderately less important than A (indicated by the 1/3) and D is very, 
very strongly less important than A.   In other words, B is the most important rated criteria on this line.  
One can also see that the reciprocal is also true and must be utilized to fill out column A. 
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 D1 D2 D3 Priority Weight: 
Community 
D1 1 5 8 0.9502 
D2 1/5 1 1/2 0.0175 
D3 1/8 2 1 0.0322 
Table 4.   Priority Weights of Factor D: Community43 
 
Factor A          
0.0639 
B          
0.3817 
C          
0.1427 
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Table 5.   Composite Weighted Scores44 
In Step 3, Figure 1, the focus shifts to site data collection and analysis.   There 
will be a specific site value for each sub-factor weight above.  Site data will generally be 
a mix of qualitative and quantitative indicators, which requires two distinct analyses.  
                                                 
43 Yang and Lee,  “AHP Decision Model,” 253.  Table 5 shows the weighting of sub-factors within a 
priority factor.  
44 Yang and Lee,  “AHP Decision Model,” 249.  Bolded values transfer to final calculations. 
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Quantitative site information (normalized when necessary45) is compared directly while 
qualitative factors for the site under consideration are ranked by pairwise comparison and 
valued as described above.  The sub-factor composite weight from Table 5 will be 
combined with the sub-factor site-specific rating in order to provide the sub-factor final 
score.  Table 7 provides an example of a quantitative site comparison.   
 
 Site 1 Site 2 Site 3 A2 Site Value 
A2    
  Site 1 1 1/4 5 0.4783
  Site 2 4 1 6 0.3650
  Site 3 1/5 1/6 1 0.1566
Table 6.   Qualitative Site Calculations46 
Table 7 provides an illustrative example where the values in raw form show a 
lower value when that specific actually has a higher indication in much the same as a golf 
score (low value wins).  The values of 15, 3, and 7 show that site two is the preferred site 
because it has the lowest score.  However, these values must be normalized to align with 
the mathematical convention where a higher priority is indicated by a higher value and 
keep with the convention of the model.  Essentially, the inverse must be calculated for 
comparison in this case.  Yang and Lee utilize a value of 100 divided by the raw score to 
determine specific ratings values and the subsequent percentage value of the three sites.47  
                                                 
45 In order to compare quantitative data, values will require normalization when the basis for 
comparison is not identical.  This will occur in cases where different sources categorize raw scores in 
different manners (e.g., total crimes in a metropolitan area vs crime per capita) or when data indicates the 
inverse to numerical conventions (e.g., like a golf game where low score wins).  In either case, this will 
require normalization to convert raw data values into like characteristics for use in subsequent calculations.  
The exact normalization procedure will depend on the specific parameters of the data sets and be described 
where applicable. 
46 Yang and Lee,  “AHP Decision Model,” 254.  Bolded values transfer to final calculations. 
47 Using a value of 1 instead of 100 would have yielded the same results.  The author estimates that 
Yang and Lee utilize 100 in order to minimize the number of places behind the decimal for presentation 
clarity. 
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Of note, the data used in the AHP example by Yang and Lee provide a theoretical 
representation of business data for arguments sake. 
 
Factor A1 Ti  = 100/A1 Ratings value = Ti/ΣTi 
Site 1 15 6.66 0.123 
Site 2 3 33.33 0.614 
Site 3 7 14.28 0.263 
Table 7.   Quantitative Site Calculations48 
Step 4 of Figure 1, Analyze Comparative Results simply involves calculating total 
scores for each site, leading to Step 5, Identify Preferred Site(s).  Table 8 indicates the 
final results for our site selection illustrative example.  In this hypothetical case, Site 2 
receives the highest score, indicating that it is the best choice based on the priority factors 
specified by the DM, which for this example were market (A), transportation (B), labor 
(C), and community (D).  Step 6, Final Recommendations, involves making a 
recommendation to the DM based on the model’s analysis. 
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 0.4834 0.7559 0.2975 
Table 8.   Overall Site Selection Rating49 
 
B. FROM BUSINESS TO DEFENSE 
What elements should leadership assess when considering different sites for a 
combatant command’s permanent location?  The following analysis is based on a 
combination of the above model, where business and military decision calculi overlap, 
and the author’s personal experience while assigned to two combatant commands, where 
they do not.  DM input is inferred from statements in primary and secondary sources and 
published DoD doctrine.  Because the purpose of this thesis is to test the model on 
SOUTHCOM then use it to recommend a location for AFRICOM’s headquarters, the 
                                                 
49 Yang and Lee,  “AHP Decision Model,” 249. 
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model is specified with the particular missions of these two commands in mind.  If it 
were applied to other subordinate commands, it would need to be adapted to the overall 
mission of the relevant command. 
1. Combatant Command Problem Decomposition 
Joint Publication 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces, defines overall mission 
guidance and lays the groundwork for addressing the strategic and operational levels of 
the military.50  It states that a combatant command has “a broad continuing mission 
…necessitating a single strategic direction.”51  It must to be able to plan, integrate, and 
execute several large-scale operations over a “large geographic area requiring single 
responsibility for effective coordination.”52 In other words, it performs the task of 
coordinating and integrating strategic policy, guidance, and objectives with the 
operational forces to achieve the country’s strategic ends.    
The current state of SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM AORs require mission 
orientation primarily focused on Theater Security Cooperation than the kinetic missions 
more commonly associated with the military, however, as with any combatant command 
they must remain prepared to undertake kinetic missions when directed to do so.  All 
commands need to function with negligible disruptions in planning and operations to 
ensure continuity of effort, which implies a stable and secure host city or region.   
Continual disruptions undermine the long-range focus required for attaining strategic 
                                                 
50 Per DoD Joint Publication 1-02, page 523 the strategic level of warfare is that  “level of war at 
which a nation, often as a member of a group of nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or 
coalition) strategic security objectives and guidance, and develops and uses national resources to achieve 
these objectives. Activities at this level establish national and multinational military objectives; sequence 
initiatives; define limits and assess risks for the use of military and other instruments of national power; 
develop global plans or theater war plans to achieve those objectives; and provide military forces and other 
capabilities in accordance with strategic plans.”  Per page 399, the operational level of war is that  “level of 
war at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to achieve strategic 
objectives within theaters or other operational areas. Activities at this level link tactics and strategy by 
establishing operational objectives needed to achieve the strategic objectives, sequencing events to achieve 
the operational objectives, initiating actions, and applying resources to bring about and sustain these 
events.” 
51 United States Department of Defense, 2007, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States 
(Washington, DC, 2007), V-5-V-6.  Joint publications are commonly referred to as JP’s; i.e., Joint 
Publication 1 is JP-1. 
52 Department of Defense, JP-1, V-6. 
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goals.  In concert with the need for stability and security is the requirement for local 
physical infrastructure to support the thousands of personnel assigned.53  Local 
communities must be able to absorb the influx of personnel and provide sufficient level 
of support for them to operate effectively and live comfortably.  In addition, the local 
community must be willing to support a headquarters.  If significant dissent makes it 
unsafe or untenable for the headquarters to operate, it will have great difficulty in 
achieving its objectives.  Finally, daily operating costs should be commensurate with 
anticipated objectives.  These are the most important broad requirements for the 
command.  Thus, the first hierarchical level factors are strategic access, local 
infrastructure, and local environment. 
a. Strategic Access 
Recent government emphases promote greater integration amongst 
departments, particularly when responsibility for overseas missions becomes more 
intertwined and interdependent.  Following this trend, recent military leaders have 
indicated the importance and need to increase cross discipline understanding and 
coordination in order to promote U.S. government objectives.54 
Strategic Access provides the engagement opportunities that synchronize 
activities within the AOR and amongst strategic actors, including planning, coordination, 
and execution of operations (e.g., joint and combined exercises, security cooperation, 
humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, operations, etc.).  It includes a broad group of 
partner organizations that have similar objectives in and around the combatant 
command’s AOR, such as businesses, extra-regional countries, non-governmental 
organizations, host nations55 and U.S. government agencies.  No single location will 
maximize access to all of these potential partners.  For example, a forward location will 
maximize access to regional states, while reducing access to partners in the U.S. 
                                                 
53 This figure includes the combatant commander’s staff, base support personnel (medical, security, 
administrative, etc.), and locals (foreign nationals, U.S. citizens, or both dependent on location). 
54 Ward,  “Charlie Rose Show,”  Stavridis,  “Posture Statement 2008.” 
55 Note:  this thesis uses host nation and partner nation.  Host nation is the nation where the combatant 
command will reside, while partner nation is any nation with which the U.S. will engage. 
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government, mostly located in Washington, DC, and/or strategic partners, located across 
the globe.  Strategic access is thus a very broad category that must be broken into more 
manageable sub-factors.  The first is access to other U.S. government agencies that 
develop coordinated, coherent strategies and policies with DoD and combatant 
commands to align U.S. government objectives and maximize efficiency and 
effectiveness.   The second is access to strategic partners and the third access to regional 
nations and their militaries and security forces. 
DoD Joint Publications state unity of effort between DoD and other U.S. 
government agencies can only be accomplished through “close, continuous interagency 
and interdepartmental coordination, which are necessary to overcome “departmental 
differences and bureaucratic hurdles.56  Essentially, the ability to synchronize and operate 
with other U.S. government agencies is paramount in executing a united U.S. strategy.  
Significant concerns occur when military commands are posted forward and disconnects 
occur as these commands move to engage with local governments.  These concerns 
generally center on the development of policy from the front without coordination, 
consideration, or input from centers of government.  This concern reaches back to the 
early to mid-1900s when the United States expanded its influence as a result of world 
conflicts.57 
The second sub-factor, strategic partners, has become more important as 
relationships between government, business, and social organizations have become more 
complex and combatant commands have been called upon to expand beyond traditional 
relationships to advance security.  These entities are grouped under the moniker ‘strategic 
partners’ because they are entities with which the USG does not have formally 
established relationships and therefore must use diplomacy to establish and coordinate 
strategic goals and objectives. 
Finally, the ability to engage regional nations within a combatant 
commands’ AOR may mean increasing the ability of a regional state to defend itself 
                                                 
56 United States Department of Defense, JP-1, VII-1 - VII-2. 
57 Zink,  “American Military Government Organization,” 330-332. 
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against aggressive neighbors or aiding a state with internal security, through training of 
gendarmerie, police, or military.  These activities usually include security cooperation 
assistance58 and combined exercises (two or more country participants).  Important to the 
success of these missions is the command’s understanding of the recipient country’s 
culture, including how to interpret and communicate desired needs and outcomes.  Recent 
studies highlight the impact that diasporas have on home country politics and economic 
factors.59  Significant benefit can be gained when a city has a significant local diaspora as 
it lends unique insight into cultural understanding and will likely hold direct links 
through family ties back to the host country.  Therefore, regional access is supported by 
formal (e.g., embassy) and informal (e.g., diaspora) segments. 
b. Site Infrastructure 
Site infrastructure evaluates the city’s capabilities to support command 
function and operations.  The city must provide reliable electricity, water, and sanitation.  
The command also needs close access to transportation networks that allow equipment 
and personnel to travel freely.  Finally, the location cost of living needs to be considered.  
Therefore, local infrastructures three sub-factors utilities, transportation, and the cost of 
living.   
Transportation requirements extend beyond the boundaries of within and 
around the host city to include the ability to support various means of international travel 
that support movements of operational elements that will execute theater security 
cooperation activities as indicated in current mission statements.  The command’s 
recommended location should be in close proximity to transport hubs that can handle its 
operational forces and therefore the local transportation infrastructure must have a 
demonstrated capability to handle modest levels of heavy equipment such as wide body 
aircraft and transport ships.   
                                                 
58 Security assistance includes a vast array of programs such as foreign military sales, foreign military 
financing, education exchanges, and senior leader visits both in the United States and abroad. 
59 Yossi Shain,  “Ethnic Diasporas and U.S. Foreign Policy,” Political Science Quarterly 109, No 5, 
Winter 1994-1995, 811-813; Yossi Shain and Aharon Barth,  “Diasporas and International Relations 
Theory,” International Organization 57, No 3, Summer 2003, 449-452; William J. Lahneman,  “Impact of 
Diaspora Communities on National and Global Politics,” CIA Strategic Assessment Group, 5 July 2005, i. 
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The host infrastructure factor should also have a low cost of living, while 
still providing adequate support.  In some cases, a higher cost of living will be offset by 
strategic advantages. 
c. Local Environment 
Local environment indicates whether a city/region provides a safe 
environment for command function and a safe living environment for accompanying 
support staff and families 
The ability to plan and coordinate requires a fairly benign and secure 
environment and one in which the threat of attack or violence is low.  Even the threat of 
an attack results in increased force protection, which has an impact on the ability of 
planners to coordinate with other entities and develop complete plans.   
 
 
Figure 3.   Combatant Command Factor Decomposition 
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2. Determining Weighted Values 
This section determines factor weights based on the need for a combatant 
command to perform common functions at the strategic level in support of DoD doctrine 
and focused mission areas that SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM share (e.g., TSC).   
a. Level One Hierarchy Factor Weighted Values 
Strategic access has already been established as the priority factor in 
determining the location of a command.  Nevertheless, the three level one factors must 
still be compared against one another to determine specific factor weights.  Strategic 
access is more important than local infrastructure because it is the key component and 
mission of a command.  Local infrastructure and environment support the headquarters’ 
mission and thus affect its efficiency.  Thus, strategic access is assigned a value of 3 in 
comparison to site infrastructure (moderately more important) and a value of 2 in 
comparison to site infrastructure (weakly more important).  
A country that has less developed infrastructure, but is significantly more 
stable presents a better option than one that has more developed infrastructure, but 
experiences significant violence or instability.  As a result, local environment is more 
important than site infrastructure and given a value of 2 (weakly more important) (Table 
9).  
 
 A B C Factor Weights 
A. Strategic Access 1 3 2 0.5396 
B. Site 
Infrastructure 
1/3 1 1/2 0.1634 
C. Local 
Environment 
1/2 2 1 0.2970 
Table 9.   Hierarchy Level 1 Factor Weights 
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b. Sub-factor Weighted Values 
The U.S. government is committed to developing a collective, holistic 
government policy to focus efforts, increase efficiencies, and ideally increase policy 
effectiveness.60  In U.S. government access, DoD plays a supporting role to other 
government agencies in USG operations, except when directly engaged in combat while 
it has significant relations with other nations’ military and security forces.  Therefore, 
U.S. government access and partner nation engagement are mutually supporting efforts 
and therefore are weighted equal to each other in a pairwise comparison, with a value of 
1 (equal importance).  In a pairwise comparison vis-à-vis strategic partner engagement 
both are assigned a value of 3 (moderately more important).  The unique tools that 
strategic partners bring are additive when combined in common efforts (Table 10).  
 
 A1 A2 A3 Sub-factor  Weight 
A1 U.S. Government 
Access 
1 3 1 0.4286 
A2 Strategic Partner 
Engagement 
1/3 1 1/3 0.1429 
A3 Partner Nations 
Engagement 
1 3 1 0.4286 
Table 10.   Strategic Access Sub-factor Weights 
The relative importance of site infrastructure sub-factors is less obvious.  
The rank ordering was determined to be utilities, transportation, and cost of living 
because utilities (water and sewage, communications and technology, and energy) are 
necessary for the day-to-day functioning of the command.  Compared to both 
transportation and cost of living, utilities is ranked a 2 (weakly more important).  
Transportation is ranked a 3 (moderately more important) vis-à-vis cost of living because 
it plays a larger role in operational requirements (Table 11).   Final combatant command 
results are provided in Table 12. 
                                                 
60 Ward,  “Charlie Rose Show”;  Stavridis,  “Posture Statement 2008,” 11-14. 
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 B1 B2 B3 Sub-Factor Weights 
B1 Utilities Service 1 2 3 0.5278 
B2 Transportation 1/2 1 3 0.3325 
B3 Cost of Living 1/2 1/3 1 0.1397 
Table 11.   Site Infrastructure Sub-factor Weights 
 
Factor A          
0.5396 
B          
0.1634 
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C   0.2970 0.2970 
Table 12.   Combatant Command Composite Weights 
3. Indicators and Measurements 
a. Strategic Access Indicators 
Measuring access depends on the ability of two entities to engage in order 
to achieve common ground.  Engagement at this level requires close, frequent, and near 
immediate coordination across agencies in order to achieve unity of effort and policy.  
Policy development at this level cannot be achieved without this level of coordination.  
With the advent of communication networks and technologies it becomes much easier for 
these entities to reach across the miles to develop and integrate plans and operations, but 
these methods have limitations which are affected by a variety of factors such as weather, 
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utility failures, public disturbances, bandwidth shortages, and a host of other interruptions 
that cause significant delays in policy development.  And, the ability to engage directly 
across a table with partners remains a very important aspect of coordination, particularly 
with complex issues involving multiple parties.  These considerations led to the 
identification of the following measures for strategic access factors.  
(1) USG Agency Strategic Access Indicator.  The indicator is the 
ease of travel (i.e., direct flights) between Washington, D.C. and potential headquarters 
locations.    Washington, D.C. is served by three airports within reasonable distance, 
therefore all three airports will figure into the indicator.  Similarly, if a potential site is 
served by greater than one airport; those airports will be considered in the final 
calculation.  Frequency of direct flights is the measure of access.  Site scores are the 
percentage of direct flights to DC from all sites under consideration accounted for by a 
specific site. 
       DC Flights/day site X 
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− = A1 site X value 
∑ DC flights/day all sites 
Flight and distance information are obtained from the U.S. 
Department of Transportation.  Domestic information is obtained from the Research and 
Innovative Technology Administration, Bureau of Travel Statistics (BTS) database 
(available at www.bts.gov).  International statistics are obtained from the Office of 
Aviation and International Affairs (available at 
http://ostpxweb.dot.gov/aviation/usstatreport.htm#Report).   These databases only go 
back to 1995 and 1996 respectively.  Data for the SOUTHCOM decision in 1947 will be 
compiled from other sources (see chapter three for specifics).   
(2) Strategic Partner Engagement Indicators.  Therefore, three 
measures are used create an indicator of strategic partner engagement: trade volume is 
used as an indication of the volume of business moving through the host city, an indirect 
indicator of business access (in dollar equivalents between through the host city), 
NGO/IGO headquarters measures the daily access, and strategic level international 
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meetings measure the importance of the host city in the international spectrum.  Trade 
data comes from U.S. Census Bureau Statistical Abstract of the United States 
publications.  International organization and non-governmental organization data comes 
from the Yearbook of International Organizations published by the Union of International 
Associations.  In similar fashion to USG Access, site values are a percentage value of the 
host city in comparison to the other competing sites.  The three site measures (trade, 
NGO/IGO HQs, and international meetings) will be averaged to determine the site value. 
(3) Regional Nation Engagement Indicators.  This indicator 
measures the capacity of two representatives (e.g., defense attaché of state in AOR and 
combatant command planner) to engage one another in analyzing and solving common 
problems cooperatively.  Recent emphases within DoD focus on the ability to understand 
cultural traits and differences to minimize barriers to progress and maximize channels to 
progress.61  Regional nation engagement can occur in one of two ways: directly when a 
nation hosts a combatant command, or indirectly, through a combination of embassies, 
consulates, and diaspora from the AOR in question.  Formal (consulates and embassies) 
and informal (diaspora) elements are combined in the measure of access: formal because 
of its policy making implications, and informal because of its affect on understanding 
regional nation cultures. By definition, a regional location provides greater opportunity 
for access.  However, engagement beyond the host country to others in the region may be 
significantly limited by the host’s access to and relations with the remainder of the AOR.  
The formal aspect of embassies and/or consulates is a simple count of the number present 
in each potential site and then using the comparable percentage value of all sites.  In and 
of itself, a diaspora cannot be the single point of access into a country, but can instead 
augment an existing formal channel such as a consulate.  The total numbers of AOR 
diasporas and population of these diaspora will indicate their prominence and therefore 
potential for access. The final site values will be calculated according to the following  
formula - Formal channels are weighted three times more important than the combination 
                                                 
61 White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC, 
March 2006), 45; Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, DC, 6 
February 2006), 78-79, 89. 
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of population percentage of AOR ethnic groups (e.g., Hispanic) and the number of 
distinct AOR diaspora (e.g., Cuban, Dominican, etc). 
0.75(Formal norm) + 0.125(Informal % + Distinct Diaspora)    =  A3 Site value 
Embassy data comes from Department of State Websites of U.S. 
Embassies , Consulates, and Diplomatic Missions (available at www.usembassy.gov) and 
GoAbroad.com (available at www.embassiesabroad.com) sources for embassies and 
consulates. For SOUTHCOM 1947, Embassy data comes from the Yearbook of 
International Organizations, 1950.  Diaspora information will be a composite of the 
following - CIA World Factbook, Nationmaster.com, host government websites, internet 
diaspora sources, and chambers of commerce.  Specific sources will be cited where 
required. 
b. Site Infrastructure Indicators 
The utilities indicator is a composite of three measures water, energy, and 
communications provisions as a percentage of availability or reliability.   Data comes 
predominately from The World Bank World Development Indicators yearly publications.  
The measures values are a percentage comparison of the sites.  These values are then 
averaged to determine the utilities sub-factor site value.   
Transportation focuses on air and sea ports because overland transport 
does not provide logistical support at the strategic level between the United States and 
AOR countries. Transportation data comes from the U.S. Department of Transportation 
(available at http://ostpxweb.dot.gov/aviation/usstatreport.htm#Report), Statistical 
Abstract of the United States publications, and the World Development Indicators 
publications.  Specific measures are the passengers enplaned per year, freight cargo 
between either the U.S. and host nation country or the host nation country and the 
specific U.S. city under consideration.  Site-specific measurement values are percent 
values of the total.  The final score is the sum of the site measures weighted equally.  
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       ∑ site measures 
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−  = Transport Cumulative Site Value 
∑ Measures for all sites 
Cost of living data is measured by the Consumer Prince Index (CPI).  
Domestic data comes from the Statistical Abstract of the United States publications and 
international data comes from the United States Department of State Indexes of Living 
Costs Abroad, Quarters Allowances, and Cost Differentials. Both sources are from the 
same time period and provide a common denominator to Washington, D.C.   Specific site 
values are divided to Washington, D.C. and then compared on a normative basis. 
c. Local Environment Indicator 
Local environment is measured by Freedom House political rights (PR) 
and civil liberties (CL) scores.  Trends in political and civil rights, in combination with a 
thorough analysis of the Freedom House written summary provide the basis for a 
qualitative assessment of each location.  The scores indicate the trend in PR and CL 
progress over the 15 years preceding the location decision.  A graph that shows frequent 
changes indicates that the location is in political flux and potentially unstable.  A review 
of the report is used to determine the volatility of a country and its support for the rule of 
law.  A country rated Not Free does not necessarily have a propensity for violence.  
Changes in PR and CL in combination with large-scale violence indicate instability and 
thus an inhospitable environment for a command headquarters.  Final site values are 
compared through qualitative analysis, rated in pairwise comparison using the definitions 
in Table 2.  The intensities of ratings are then input into the matrix to determine the site 
values.  
The process described above is necessary to determine the final scores in 
order to compare the site locations objectively.  This process is next applied to 
SOUTHCOM to review the relocation decision and evaluate the final decision.  Finally, 
the It is applied to AFRICOM’s location discussion to recommend a final site best suited 
for the command to achieve its mission. 
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III. UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND: WAS MIAMI 
THE RIGHT CHOICE? 
A. A BRIEF HISTORY 
SOUTHCOM has gone through many changes during its long history as it faced 
different strategic challenges and was modified and adapted in response to these changes 
in focus and mission.  It was positioned in Panama City, Panama from 1948 to 1997, 
when it was relocated to Miami, Florida.  This presents two opportunities in which to test 
the model developed in the previous chapter: the initial decision to locate in Panama and 
the subsequent decision to relocate in Miami.    
The United States first positioned forces in the current SOUTHCOM AOR in 
1903 when U.S. Marines deployed to Panama to protect the Panama Railroad.  These 
forces maintained a permanent presence in varying forms from then until 1997, when the 
entire command relocated to Miami.  The initial deployment was single service oriented 
and positioned as an operational level of command designed first to protect the Panama 
Railroad, then the construction of the Panama Canal, and finally, to defend the canal and 
ensure uninterrupted operation of a strategic choke point.  During World War I, the U.S. 
Army designated the command as the Caribbean Defense Command (CDC), a geographic 
command.  As threats grew during World War II, the command came to include Air and 
Navy units making it a de facto combatant command.  In 1947, President Harry Truman 
signed the National Security Act, establishing the Unified Command Plan (UCP), which 
initiated the combatant command structure currently in place.  CDC changed its name to 
United States Caribbean Command and became fully operational on 10 March 1948.  It 
was designated United States Southern Command in 1967 when the UCP was modified. 
President Jimmy Carter signed the Panama Canal Treaties in 1977, transferring 
responsibility for security of the canal to Panama on 1 January 2000.  As part of this 
transition, SOUTHCOM was directed to find another location from which to execute its 
mission.  The initial list of more than 100 potential locations was reduced to a short list of  
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5: New Orleans, Louisiana; Tampa and Miami, Florida, San Juan, Puerto Rico; and 
Atlanta, Georgia.62  This review will include SOUTHCOM’s first location, Quarry 
Heights, Panama. 
B. SOUTHERN COMMAND TRANSITIONS TO A COMBATANT 
COMMAND 
1. SOUTHCOM 1947 
Until implementation of the Panama Canal Treaty, SOUTHCOM’s location was 
determined solely by tactical and operational need to provide security for the Panama 
Canal.  Although the region grew in importance over its first five decades, and the 
command grew as well, its core mission and its established location remained the same.  
Was Panama the right location for SOUTHCOM?     
This section analyzes whether any of the five cities on the short list for the 
relocation decision in 1997 would have been a better overall location for SOUTHCOM in 
the late 1940s. Data for the 1947 time period is less available then for the 1997 model so 
alternate measures are required in some places. 
2. Evaluating SOUTHCOM’s Initial Location Using the AHP Model 
a. A1 - United States Government Access 
Access to the U.S. seat of government in Washington D.C. was extremely 
limited in the immediate post World War Two time period.  Air travel within the United 
States was in its fledgling stage and offered little in the way of mass transit, although,  
travel within the contiguous states was growing quickly.  Of the six locations under 
consideration, Atlanta and Miami were the first to support major airlines offering 
significant numbers of flights within the United States and between the U.S. and the 
SOUTHCOM AOR.  Because of the significantly different travel situation, the alternate 
measure of distance between potential location and Washington, D.C. will be used 
                                                 
62 At least 96 total locations were considered in the course of this location decision.   “Military Center 








Panama 2065 0.0774 
New Orleans 974 0.1642 
Tampa 822 0.1945 
Miami 929 0.1721 
San Juan 1563 0.1023 
Atlanta 552 0.2896 
Table 13.   A1 - SOUTHCOM 1947-50 USG Access 
 
b. A2 - Strategic Partner Engagement 
Trade data comes from the Statistical Abstract of the United States 1951, 
only year 1947 is used in this calculation because this is the only year for which data is 
listed for all potential locations.  The Yearbook of International Organizations, 1948 
shows no headquarters or high-level meetings for the potential locations.  Therefore, 
engagement site values with strategic partners will be limited to trade data for the year 
1947 because this provides the most complete analysis point to determine strategic 
partner integration as defined in the model.  U.S. totals for IGO/NGO data are provided 


















Panama 220,789 0 0 0.0823 
New Orleans, 
LA 
1,275,775 0 0 0.4755 
Tampa, FL 282,493 0 0 0.1053 
Miami, FL 282,493 0 0 0.1053 
Puerto Rico 511,255 0 0 0.1906 
Atlanta, GA 110,161 0 0 0.0411 
US NA 77 10  
Table 14.   A2 - SOUTHCOM 1947-50 Strategic Partner Engagement 
 
c. A3 - Partner Nation Engagement 
Embassy data comes from the Yearbook of International Organizations, 
1950.  U.S. city Latin/Hispanic population percentages come from the earliest available 
U.S. census data which is 1980.  Panama and Puerto Rico percentages are at or near 100 
percent.  There are no distinct diaspora numbers for this time period.   
                                                 
63 United States, 1951, Statistical Abstract of the United States 1951, Seventy-second edition, US 





















Panama 15 0.6250 100 0.4307 0.5278 
New Orleans 3 0.1250 3.78 0.0163 0.0706 
Tampa 1 0.0417 4.98 0.0214 0.0316 
Miami 3 0.1250 23.46 0.1010 0.1130 
Puerto Rico 2 0.0833 98.8 0.4255 0.2544 
Atlanta 0 0 1.17 0.0050 0.0025 
Table 15.   A3 - SOUTHCOM 1947-50 Partner Nation Engagement 
 
d. B1 - Utilities 
Alternate sources were consulted to provide a means of evaluating utilities 
indicators for this timeframe.66  Available Water and Sanitation data from the World 
Bank World Development Indicators for 1978 was used as this is the earliest available 
infrastructure data.  This does not reflect the situation in 1947, but assumes that levels 
would have been lower then but the relative differences between the six locations would 
have remained largely the same.  The 1978 data shows a significant gap in utilities 
provisions between Panama and Puerto Rico on the one hand, and the continental U.S. 
locations on the other.  Panama provided just 77 percent of the urban population with 
clean water.   
                                                 
64 Union of International Associations, Yearbook of International Organizatons, 1950 = Editions de 
l’Annuaire des Organisations Internationales (Geneva, 1950), 803-845. 
65 United States, County and City Data Book 1983, 10th edition, US Bureau of the Census, US 
Government Printing Office (Washington, DC, 1983), 74, 88, 102, 116, 252. 
66  United Nations, Economic Survey of Latin America 1953; United Nations Publication (New York, 
1954), 408; Mitchell, Brian R., International Historic Statistics: The Americas 1750-1993, Fourth Ed 
(Macmillan, London, 1998), 232. 
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Energy data is more readily available, albeit at the national rather than the 
municipal level.  Thus, country values for energy output are for qualitative assessment for 
utilities overall.  Energy demand in Panama surpassed supply.  Several power plants were 
planned in the next five years to address this shortage.  Energy production in the United 
States surpassed the region by a factor of nearly 1,000 and could support the demands of 
any of the cities under question.  Bottom line, all U.S. locations will be rated the same 
because there is no available data suggesting otherwise.   
Finally, utilities assessment included developing communications 
architecture in all locations with usage in the United States exceeding that in both 
Panama and Puerto Rico by factors over 100.  Puerto Rico’s communications architecture 
provided a range of two to three factors over Panama.  Site values are determined using a 
pairwise comparison.  All U.S. locations have equal values in relation to each other.  
Final evaluations are U.S. at a value of 9 (extreme importance) over Panama and a value 
of 4 (moderate plus) over Puerto Rico.  Puerto Rico is judged at a value of 5 (Strong) 
over Panama. 
 
 Panama NO Tampa Miami PR Atlanta Site Value 
Panama 1 1/9 1/9 1/9 1/5 1/9 0.0226 
New Orleans 9 1 1 1 4 1 0.2276 
Tampa 9 1 1 1 4 1 0.2276 
Miami 9 1 1 1 4 1 0.2276 
Puerto Rico 5 1/4 1/4 1/4 1 1/4 0.0671 
Atlanta 9 1 1 1 4 1 0.2276 
Table 16.   B1 - SOUTHCOM 1947-50 Utilities Site Values 
e. B2 - Transportation 
Transportation was undergoing significant development during the post 
war period as air travel for the masses was in its infancy.  U.S. Census bureau sources for 
Foreign Trade are limited to 1964 data because that is the closest to the decision point 
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available.  Due to several  “no data available” comments, a qualitative analysis is 
performed on this sub-factor.  Sea transport has New Orleans with a significant lead in 
ship sea transport followed by Puerto Rico and Tampa at approximately half and Miami 
and Atlanta trailing significantly.  Panama is rated equal with Puerto Rico based on 
similar capabilities.  Air transport is less clear because the data shows only for the state of 
Florida and does not break out individual location values.  The value of 126,094,000 
pounds is almost ten times greater than the second highest total, Puerto Rico.  This 
indicates that Florida airports have greater capacity than the other potential sites.  Based 
on capabilities for this timeframe, Miami was the most capable of Florida’s airports.  
Remaining rankings have Tampa, Puerto Rico, New Orleans, Atlanta, and Panama. 
Overall, New Orleans is the number one location, followed by Puerto 
Rico, Miami, Tampa, Panama, and Atlanta.  Specific values are listed below (Table 18). 
 






B2 Sea Transport 
(mil lbs) 
(1000 #)68 
Panama nd nd nd 
New Orleans nd 8,026 31,719.9 
Florida -- 126,094 -- 
Tampa nd nd 14,511.4 
Miami nd nd 5,591.0 
Puerto Rico nd 13,941 16,930.4 
Atlanta nd 2,12369 5,422.6 
Table 17.   SOUTHCOM 1947-50 Transportation Raw Data 
                                                 
67  United States, Bureau of Census, U.S. Airborne Foreign Trade Summary Report, FT986 Jan-Dec 
1964 (Washington DC, 1965), 3-4. 
68 United States, Bureau of Census, U.S. Waterborne Foreign Trade Summary Report, FT985 Jan-Dec 
1964 (Washington DC, 1965), 4-9. 
69 Data for Georgia is not available.  This total is the remaining import/export data for approximately 
10 customs zones not listed.  
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 Panama NO Tampa Miami PR Atlanta Site Value 
Panama 1 1/4 1/3 1/4 1/3 1 0.0567 
New Orleans 4 1 3 3 4 5 0.3966 
Tampa, FL 3 1/3 1 1/2 2 3 0.1521 
Miami, FL 4 1/3 2 1 3 4 0.2302 
Puerto Rico 3 1/4 1/2 1/3 1 3 0.1108 
Atlanta, GA 1 1/5 1/3 1/4 1/3 1 0.0535 
Table 18.   B2 - SOUTHCOM 1947-50 Site Values 
f. B3 - Cost of Living 
Table 19 indicates the normalized costs of living using the consumer price 
indexes as provided in the United Nations Statistical Yearbook.  Data in this source 
highlight all items or food ailments.  Food ailments will be the source because data for 
Panama does not exist for all items in this reference.  Dates are the average of the years 
from 1947 to 1949 with a baseline date of 1937 for reference.  Specific data was not 
available for all U.S. cities; therefore, all cities will be assigned equal values. 
 B370 Ti ((1/B3)*100)) Ratings (Ti/ΣTi) 
Panama 192.7 0.5190 0.1678 
New Orleans, LA 192.0 0.5208 0.1684 
Tampa, FL 192.0 0.5208 0.1684 
Miami, FL 192.0 0.5208 0.1684 
Puerto Rico 203.7 0.4910 0.1587 
Atlanta, GA 192.0 0.5208 0.1684 
Table 19.   B3 - SOUTHCOM 1947-50 Cost of Living 
                                                 
70 United Nations, Statistical Yearbook 1949-50 New York, 1950), 401. 
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g. C - Local Environment 
Freedom House rankings began in 1972.  As a result, an overview of the 
sites histories must be done fulfill the requirement to assess their stability and security of 
the locations under consideration for SOUTHCOM from 1947 to 1950.  The source 
chosen to support the assessment on Panama was George Thomas Kurian’s Encyclopedia 
of the Third World71.  Panama achieved independent, most recently from Colombia in 
1903.  The country experienced violent overthrow of its governments in 1941, 1949, and 
1951.   
Puerto Rico enjoyed a less violent early 1900s; however, it did so at the 
expense of political rights.  Voting rights were non-existent until 1948 when the first 
democratically elected governor assumed office.  It was during this period that Puerto 
Rico began drafting its first constitution as it moved toward being a U.S. territory with 
internal self-determination.  Some independence groups turned violent as the referendum 
drew closer in 1951. 
The United States locations were not free from violence.  All are located 
in the U.S. South, and the violence experienced was racially motivated.  In addition, 
political rights were limited de jure by voting requirements necessary and de facto to the 
white population.  Still, the U.S. locations were determined more stable than Panama on a 
level of 5 (strongly) and Puerto Rico on a level of 3 (moderate).  Puerto Rico is rated as 3 
(moderate) over Panama.  Table 20 below utilizes these values in the qualitative matrix to 
determine the specific site values.  All U.S. cities will be rated as a 1 against each other 
and adopt the rankings above due to the lack of specific supporting data to differentiate 
between them. 
                                                 
71 George Thomas Kurian, Encyclopedia of the Third World, Fourth Edition, Vol III (Panama to 
Zimbabwe), Facts on File, NY, NY, 1992, 1491-1510. 
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 Panama NO Tampa Miami PR Atlanta Site Value 
Panama 1 1/5 1/5 1/5 1/3 1/5 0.0403 
New Orleans 5 1 1 1 3 1 0.2194 
Tampa, FL 5 1 1 1 3 1 0.2194 
Miami, FL 5 1 1 1 3 1 0.2194 
Puerto Rico 3 1/3 1/3 1/3 1 1/3 0.0820 
Atlanta, GA 5 1 1 1 3 1 0.2194 
Table 20.   C - SOUTHCOM 1947-50 Local Environment 
 
h. SOUTHCOM 1947 Summary Analysis 
The final results summarized in Table 21 below indicate that New Orleans 
would have been the best choice for SOUTHCOM’s headquarters in the late 1940s, 
followed closely are Miami and Panama.  New Orleans’ port gives it the best access to 
strategic partners.  Panama is dominant as a result of its regional engagement score but 
falls due to transportation scores.  This is a singular sub-factor where it dominates and 
makes the location more competitive.  Given the strategic importance of the Panama 
Canal at this time, a move was not necessary as Panama proved capable of supporting the 
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C Local Environment 0.2970 0.0120 0.0652 0.0652 0.0652 0.0244 0.0652 
Score = ΣwixrijSiteY  0.1671 0.2011 0.1573 0.1752 0.1370 0.1617 
Table 21.   SOUTHCOM 1947-50 Composite Rankings 
 
C. SOUTHCOM RELOCATION 
1. Change to Come 
This section will apply the AHP combatant command model to the changed 
conditions of the mid-1990s to assess the relocation decision.  In the 1960s, a growing 
desire for Panamanian independence and increasing violence against U.S. forces 
stationed in Panama led to a changing political climate necessitating U.S. politicians to 
negotiate changes in Panamanian policy.  This resulted in the planned turnover of the 
Canal Zone and responsibility for security of the canal as well as the removal of U.S. 
military forces in the region.  Complete turnover of the canal would take place on 31 
December 1999.  SOUTHCOM was left without a host nation and the search begun to 
find a new host city. 
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2. SOUTHCOM Relocation According to AHP 
a. A1 - U.S. Government Strategic Access 
Data for direct flights between candidate cities and Washington, DC, in 
1997 was retrieved from the Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS) for U.S.  
cities and from Department of Transportation, Office of the Assistant Secretary  
for Aviation and International Affairs website for Panama  
(www. http://www.bts.gov/xml/ontimesummarystatistics/src/index.xml and 
http://ostpxweb.dot.gov/aviation/usstatreport.htm#Report respectively).   . Atlanta 
provided the best access to the USG, followed by Miami, Tampa, New Orleans, Puerto 
Rico, and finally Panama (Table 22).   
City, State(Country) Access to/from D.C. Area 
Airports (Dulles, Reagan 
National, BWI), Non-stop 
flights/day 
A1 Site Rank = 
S1 F/day / ∑( S1 - Sn 
F/day) 
Panama Negligible72 0.0000 
New Orleans 4.5 0.0674 
Tampa 9.6 0.1450 
Miami73 20.5 0.3106 
Puerto Rico 2.9 0.0440 
Atlanta 28.6 0.4329 
Table 22.   A1 - SOUTHCOM 1997 USG Access 
                                                 
72 Data was not available for 1995.  The total number of flights between Panama and D.C. area 
airports was 4 in 1997 and 0 in 1996, all on US carriers.  Per DOT reports, this data does not include code 
share flights with partner airlines.  However, significant numbers of flights between the U.S. and Panama 
occurred between other major airports such as Miami indicating that D.C. was not a main hub and that few 
direct flights were to D.C. 
73 Data includes statistics for Fort Lauderdale International Airport.  Similar to Washington, D.C., the 
Miami Metropolitan Area is served by more than one airport. 
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b. A2 - Strategic Partner Engagement 
On the factor of engaging strategic partners, Miami is ranked first, 
followed closely by Atlanta and New Orleans (Table 23).  The secretariat level 
IGO/NGO participation in Miami and its strong showing in international level meetings 
and AOR Trade throughput indicate a high level of engagement with the AOR occurring 
in the city.  Atlanta has similar numbers, but the difference in trade volume brings it to a 
close second.  Note that New Orleans leads in two categories, but due to a lack of data, 
only two measures were used to determine the final score. The Yearbook of International 
Organizations, 2003-2004 did not publish data for cities with less than 10 organizations 
having secretariat level offices residing therein.  Calculations only used the columns 
where data was provided. 
A2 AOR Trade 
(Export/Import) 
Throughput (in 




NGO/IGO Activity - 
International Level 
Meetings76 
Site  Value 
∑A2 Norms 
/ 3 
Panama 1,776 3/37 6 0.0822 
New Orleans 65,000 ND 36 0.2291 
Tampa 16,267 ND ND 0.0293 
Miami 39,433 2/64 24 0.2453 
Puerto Rico 34,758 1/49 14 0.1816 
Atlanta 28,000 0/65 27 0.2325 
U.S. Totals  291/6848 1145  
Table 23.   A2 - Strategic Partner Evaluation 
                                                 
74 United States, 1999, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1999 119th Edition) U.S. Census 
Bureau (Washington, D.C., 1999), 803-817. 
75 Union of International Associations, Yearbook of International Organizations Vol 5, 2003-2004 
(Munchen, 2004), 85-88. 
76 Union of International Associations, Yearbook 2004, 120-127. 
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c. A3 - Regional Nations Engagement 
Miami is clearly a leader on this sub-factor, due primarily to its high level 
of formal relations, with Panama and New Orleans following closely hosting 19 and 18 
consulates respectively (Table 24).    This table indicates a changing diplomatic picture 
from the earlier period as consulate and embassy presence grew in all locations except 
Panama.  Panama and Puerto Rico are clearly preferred over U.S. sites on percent 
populations of Hispanic descent.  These numbers actually reflect the dominance of 
national populations with no distinct diaspora from other countries in the AOR.  When 


































Panama 19 0.2000 100 0.3167 0* 0 0.1925 
New Orleans 18 0.1895 4.1 0.0144 0 0 0.1438 
Tampa 3 0.0316 22.1 0.0778 4 0.1667 0.0539 
Miami 25 0.2632 61.3 0.2157 15 0.6250 0.3015 
Puerto Rico 16 0.1684 98.8 0.3476 0* 0 0.1683 
Atlanta 14 0.1474 7.9 0.0278 5 0.2083 0.1399 
Table 24.   A3 - SOUTHCOM 1997 Evaluation of Regional Nation Access 
(* indicates a negligible amount of diaspora as census sources were not specific to probable diaspora) 
d. B1 - Utilities Service 
There are only small differences in utilities services from one potential 
location to another, largely because four of the six cities are in the same country.  World 
                                                 
77 Goabroad.com: Embassies and Consulates, www.embassiesabroad.com (accessed 8 February 
2009). 
78 U.S. Cities: www.census.gov (accessed 8 February 2009); Puerto Rico and Panama: www.cia.gov 
(accessed 8 February 2009). 
 49
Development Indicators 1997 and subsequent volumes list the Water/Sanitation value for 
Puerto Rico as  “no data.”  For purposes of evaluation, the author assumes it is no worse 
than Panama, and assigns it the same value of 100/89 percent availability. Norm values 
for communication architecture were calculated using a pairwise comparison because of 
the lack of specific data for the United States cities.  Based on the availability and 
numbers of phones in the U.S. at that time, availability is unlimited and installation 
occurs within days of requesting.  All cities are rated 9 (extreme) over Puerto Rico and 6 
(very strong) over Panama.  Due to the increased availability in Panama and the shorter 
waiting times for service, it is rated 5 (strong) over Puerto Rico.  The U.S. cities show 
significant advantage over Panama and Puerto Rico (Table 25). 












in largest City)82 
Wait Time 





Panama 100/89 87 67 0.9 0.0848 
New Orleans 100/100 19 ND 0.0 0.2105 
Tampa 100/100 19 ND 0.0 0.2105 
Miami 100/100 19 ND 0.0 0.2105 
Puerto Rico 100/89 99 16 2.8 0.0731 
Atlanta 100/100 19 ND 0.0 0.2105 
Table 25.   B1 - SOUTHCOM Utilities Service Site Factors 
 
                                                 
79 World Bank, World Development Indicators: 1997 (Washington DC, World Bank, 1997), 102-105 
80 World Bank, World Development Indicators: 2007 (Washington DC, World Bank, 2007), 162-165. 
81 World Bank, WDI 1997, 111-112. 
82 World Bank, WDI 1997, 272-275. 
83 World Bank, WDI 1997, 272-275. 
84 The normalization process in this case did not require the intermediate step the model did because 
the values were of equal comparison.  Normalization is required to establish the relative values between 0 
and 1 to ensure mathematical calculations are of similar characteristics. 
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e. B2 - Transportation 
Air enplanement and air cargo statistics came from DOT, Office of the 
Assistant Secretary for Aviation and International Affairs website (available at 
http://ostpxweb.dot.gov/aviation/usstatreport.htm).  The values provided are a two year 
(1996 and 1997) average using international flights into the host international airports.  
Sea transport data is the average of 1997 and 1998 using statistics from American 
Association of Port Authorities, Port Industry Statistics (available at http://www.aapa-
ports.org/ Industry).  Miami has a significant advantage over the other potential locations 
with over 60 percent of the capabilities.  Puerto Rico and Atlanta complete the top three 
cities (Table 26). 





















Panama 469.2 0.0215 61,267 0.0331 896,626 0.1692 0.746 
New 
Orleans 
134.4 0.0058 2,636 0.0014 245,238 0.0480 0.0184 
Tampa 551.0 0.0239 5,104 0.0028 5,343 0.0010 0.0092 
Miami87 15,961.8 0.6929 1,587,147 0.8563 1,499,510 0.2829 0.6107 
Puerto Rico 2,195.8 0.0953 23,555 0.0127 1,911,647 0.3607 0.1562 
Atlanta 3,696.3 0.1605 173,711 0.0937 732,668 0.1382 0.1308 
Table 26.   B2 - SOUTHCOM Transportation Site Factors 
                                                 
85 The calculation to determine the Airport norm is the result of determining the norm for both 
enplanement and cargo columns, weighting them equally and totaling the relative values. 
86 American Association of Port Authorities,  “Port Industry Statistics,” http://www.aapa-
ports.org/Industry/content.cfm?ItemNumber=900 (accessed 8 December 2008), 1997 Container Import 
Data only.   
87 Transportation statistics include Fort Lauderdale airport and Port Everglades due to close proximity 
to Miami Metropolitan area. 
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f. B3 - Cost of Living 
The top three locations for cost of living are Tampa, Panama, and New 
Orleans (Table 27).  Country normalized cost of living values are based on 1996-1998 
averages.  Panama values were obtained from the International Historical Statistics: The 
Americas (1750-2000) by B. R. Mitchell with a baseline of 1995.  Tampa, Miami, and 
Atlanta data came from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) (available at 
http://www.bls.gov/data/) with a baseline of 1982-84.  New Orleans data came from the 
BLS as well; however, specific data was not available and the Southern was based on 
separate years and calculations using the interest rate calculator allowed for all values to 
be based in 1996 dollars, the year to which Washington, D.C. was based.  The top three 
locations for cost of living are Tampa, Panama, and New Orleans. 




B3 Site Values (Ti/ΣTi) 
Panama 109.0 0.9174 0.1854 
New Orleans 116.0 0.8622 0.1743 
Tampa 121.3 0.8246 0.1667 
Miami 131.2 0.7620 0.1540 
Puerto Rico 131.0 0.7634 0.1543 
Atlanta 122.3 0.8179 0.1653 
Table 27.   B3 - SOUTHCOM Cost of Living Site Data 
 
g. C - Local Environment 
Freedom House rankings were evaluated from the time period of 1982 to 
1997.  United States values are consistent at the most desirable rating of 1 for both 
political rights (PR) and civil liberties (CL).  The Freedom of the World 1997-1998 
report indicates that the U.S. is a free country with a  “generally free media,” declining 
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criminal trend, and improvement in race and gender equality issues.  Political 
controversies are of the nature that does not have a propensity to turn violent and the 
early 1990s witnessed a change in control of the Senate and House of Representatives.88  
Each U.S. location will use the same ranking. 
Panama’s scores worsened significantly in the middle to late 1980s and 
then improved in the 1990s (Figure 4.).  It has been rated as free since 1993.  These 
improvements followed the removal of General Manuel Noriega from power by U.S. 
military forces in 1989.  Since that time governments have been regularly elected, 
although Panama continues to be characterized by corruption, drug trafficking, and 
money laundering.  Legal reforms adopted in 1990 have done little to reduce 
politicization and corruption in the legal system.  Violence against U.S. military forces 
continued after the invasion, resulting in the death of an unarmed U.S. soldier in 1992.  
Media censorship put in place during Noriega’s reign remains.89  Based on the scores and 
this review, all U.S. locations are rated as 6 (strong plus importance) over Panama. 
 






























Figure 4.   Panama Freedom House 15-Year Graph 
Puerto Rico is more free than Panama, but not as free as the U.S.  Freedom 
House has scored Puerto Rico at 1/1 (PR/CL), 1/2, or 2/1 throughout this period (Figure 
                                                 
88 Adrian Karatnycky, Aili Piano, and Arch Puddington, Freedom in the World:The Annual Survey of 
Political Rights & Civil Liberties 2003 New York: Freedom House, 2003), 526-529. 
89 Karatnycky, Piano, and Puddington,  “The Annual Survey 2003,”  405-407. 
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5).  As a U.S. commonwealth, Puerto Rican citizens are given the same constitutional 
protections and civil liberties as U.S. citizens, except for presidential voting and 
representation in the Congress (Puerto Rico’s House delegate votes in committee, but not 
on the House floor).  Puerto Ricans have consistently voted to remain a commonwealth.  
Crime, corruption, and unemployment are higher in Puerto Rico than the U.S.  Local 
governments’ efforts to deal with drug trafficking have led some to charge them with 
civil   rights abuses.90  Election violence was largely eliminated during this time period.  
All U.S. sites are ranked as a 2 (weak) over Puerto Rico and rank Puerto Rico as 4 
(moderate plus) over Panama. 






























Figure 5.   Puerto Rico Freedom House 15-Year Graph 
 Panama NO Tampa Miami PR Atlanta Site Value 
Panama 1 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/4 1/6 0.0340 
New Orleans 6 1 1 1 2 1 0.2134 
Tampa 6 1 1 1 2 1 0.2134 
Miami 6 1 1 1 2 1 0.2134 
Puerto Rico 4 1/2 1/2 1/2 1 1/2 0.1124 
Atlanta 6 1 1 1 2 1 0.2134 
Table 28.   C - SOUTHCOM 1997 Local Environment 
                                                 
90 Karatnycky, Piano, and Puddington,  “The Annual Survey 2003,” 2003,  588-589. 
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h. SOUTHCOM 1997Final Results 
The two top candidates overall are Miami, followed by Atlanta (Table 29).  
Miami provides significantly greater engagement with the SOUTHCOM AOR through 
relations with regional partners and nearly the same as strategic partners, while Atlanta is 
more accessible to other U.S. government agencies due to its greater flight access and 
shorter distance.  Because of the two airports and seaports in the Miami Metropolitan 
Area, Miami is favored for its transportation.  While not shown in the data sources, 
transportation to and from the AOR is greater than that which goes through Atlanta.   
Compared with SOUTHCOM in 1947, Miami has grown significantly in 
the areas of regional nation engagement, strategic partner engagement and its expansion 
as a transportation hub.  This growth has resulted in its development as the  “Gateway to 
the America’s.”  All U.S. cities have grown in capabilities to some extent as well, but not 
at the same pace as Miami.  Atlanta is most competitive, but still lacks in specific AOR 
engagement such as formal channels, business engagement (as indicated by trade), and 
transportation.  The final significant indicator appears to be the lack of growth exhibited 
by Panama.  Its attraction in the 1940s-50s has been overcome by growth across the 
Southeast United States. 
DoD recommended to President William J. Clinton that the command be 
relocated to Miami.  He accepted the recommendation and SOUTHCOM moved into its 
new headquarters in Miami on 26 September 1997.  Miami was chosen as host based on 
existing infrastructure that reduced initial start-up costs; quality of life for the staff; the 
city’s standing as a cultural, business, and transport hub to the AOR; and the regional 
consulates located in Miami.91   
                                                 
91 J. Jennings Moss,  “Clinton Chooses Miami as New Home of the Military’s Southern Command,” 
The Washington Times, Part A, NATION, 30 March 1995, A4 ; Jim Hampton,  “Look for Politics to 
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C Local Environment 0.2970 0.0101 0.0634 0.0634 0.0634 0.0334 0.0634 
Score = ΣwixrijSiteY  0.0765 0.1530 0.1341 0.2787 0.1148 0.2428 
 
Table 29.   SOUTHCOM 1997 Final Rankings 
 
i.  SOUTHCOM Overview 
Policy statements by General Charles Wilhelm indicated 3 years after the 
move that Miami should be the permanent site for the command.92  SOUTHCOM 
continues to work out of leased buildings not specifically designed for it and is in plans to 
break ground on a new command in the future.   SOUTHCOM’s performance in Miami 
has not been hampered in the way that it was in Quarry Heights, Panama where martial 
law had to be imposed and an invasion was conducted. 
Both models separate out wishful locations from serious contenders that 
support the requirements of a command’s location.  The top two or three candidates 
typically are within close rankings to each other, each with its own strong points as to 
where the command should be positioned.  This indicates that there may be a few  “right” 
                                                 
92 Charles Wilhelm,  “Posture Statement of General Charles E. Wilhelm, United States Marine Corps, 
Commander In Chief, United States Southern Command,” http://ftp.fas.org/irp/congress/2000_hr/00-03-
23wilhelm.htm,  March 2000, (accessed 25 November 2008). 
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choices.  Given that DoD operates with structure, significant logistical support, and a  
“can-do” attitude, any of the top locations would likely be appropriate.  What is 
significant is the gap between the top few contenders and the lower contenders.  By 
executing a thorough application of the decision making process, it is conceivable that 
decisions of this nature can be made quicker and more efficient.  SOUTHCOM itself 
highlighted its location as the  “ideal location” from which to operate.  Retired General 
Barry McCaffrey highlighted SOUTHCOM’s location as perfect on its 10 year 
anniversary.  “For its part, Southcom has greatly benefited from being in South Florida. 
Geographically, the command is perfectly located to respond to future security challenges 
across the Americas. The cultural and intellectual diversity of the city is the perfect 
setting for Southcom.”93 It has provided a perfect location from which to increase its 
security assistance activities, exercises, and host training seminars, conferences, and other 
exchanges in support of its missions. 
 
                                                 
93 Barry R. McCaffrey,  “SOUTHCOM, 10 Years in S. Florida,” The Miami Herald, 22 September 
2007, A21. 
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IV. UNITED STATES AFRICAN COMMAND: LOCATION 
ANALYSIS AND CONSIDERATIONS  
A. CANDIDATE LOCATIONS 
AFRICOM’s requirements center on its anticipated mission areas of engagement 
with government agencies and international partners utilizing security assistance 
activities.   To date, several sites have been mentioned as serious potential locations for 
AFRICOM ranging from locations in Africa to Europe and the continental U.S.  At the 
initial notification, several sites in Africa were under consideration: South Africa, Kenya, 
Nigeria, Liberia, Morocco, Ethiopia, and a few others.  Liberia is the only African 
country to offer to host the command and is therefore included in the analysis.  Morocco 
and Kenya are also included because they were considered strong potential locations, 
although they declined to host the command.   
Also included is AFRICOM’s current location in Stuttgart.  Data concerning 
Stuttgart includes nearby airport and seaport facilities such as Frankfurt or 
Mannheim/Ludwigshafen in similar fashion as Baltimore is to Washington, DC.  Two 
U.S. cities have been publicly identified as possible sites for AFRICOM headquarters, 
Atlanta and Charleston and these are therefore included in the analysis.  One additional 
U.S. city is considered: the New York Metropolitan area because of its significant 
cultural makeup as a world trade center and financial capital.  Thus, this analysis includes 
seven possible locations, three in Africa, one in Europe, and three in the United States.  
These seven locations provide a broad cross-section of available locales from major 
metropolitan areas to developing continental locations. 
B. ANALYSIS 
1. A1 - USG Access 
Direct flight access is provided via the U.S. Department of Transportation through 
two different bureaus.  Domestic flight information is provided via the Bureau of 
Transportation Statistics and international information is provided via the Office of the 
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Assistant Secretary for Aviation and International Affairs.94  Airport data for New York 
includes JFK, La Guardia, and Newark, NJ Airports and Stuttgart, Germany includes 
Stuttgart and Frankfurt A.M. airports.  This is similar to Washington, D.C. being served 
by nearby airports expanding the transportation volume supporting the region.  New York 
metropolitan area, Atlanta, and Southern Germany are the leading locations that provide 
the most direct access to the U.S. capital.  New York and Germany gain this access in 
large part to service by multiple airports.  Nairobi, Kenya, Rabat, Morocco, and 
Monrovia, Liberia are limited in direct access to Washington, D.C.  This category does 
not take into account the difference in flight time going direct from an overseas location 
to Washington.  However, in the event of two closely rated sites, the closer site should 
receive greater consideration. 
This sub-factor shows the lack of availability of convenient travel between the 




Access to/from D.C. Area 
Airports (Dulles, Reagan 
National, BWI) Direct non-
stop flights/day 
A1 Site Value = 
S1 F/day / ∑( S1 - Sn 
F/day) 
Nairobi, Kenya 0 0.0000 
Rabat, Morocco 0 0.0000 
Monrovia, Liberia 0 0.0000 
Stuttgart, Germany 9.0 0..1777 
Charleston 1.15 0.0227 
Atlanta 16.9 0.3341 
New York 23.6 0.4656 
Table 30.   A1 - AFRICOM USG Access Table 
                                                 
94 United States Department of Transportation, Bureau of Transportation Statistics, 
http://www.bts.gov/xml/ontimesummarystatistics/src/index.xml (accessed 27 February 2009);  United 
States Department of Transportation, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Aviation and International 
Affairs, http://ostpxweb.dot.gov/aviation/usstatreport.htm#Report (accessed 27 February 2009). 
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2. A2 - Strategic Partner Engagement 
Potential AFRICOM locations provide wide variation on ease of engagement with 
strategic partners (Table 31). New York has a sizable advantage over all other locations 
in trade numbers alone, but when the two other elements in the sub-factor are considered, 
Stuttgart becomes very competitive.  Despite a significant showing with hosted 
IGO/NGO headquarters, Nairobi falls short due to the number indicator for trade and 
business headquarters.   Atlanta indicates some activity as a host city for international 
symposia and enjoys significant trade and business.  Of note is the fact that this trade 
includes activity in Savannah, Georgia.  Due to their geographic proximity, both Atlanta 
and Savannah are considered by the U.S. as part of the same customs district and 
therefore trade through this area covers both cities with Atlanta being the larger 
metropolitan area while Savannah is the seaport facility.   
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 AOR Trade 
Throughput (3 
yr avg  2005-
2007) 
(Export/Import) 









Site  Value 
∑A2 Norms 
/ 3 
Nairobi, Kenya 921 51/242 41 0.0929 
Rabat, Morocco 1,441 17/57 27 0.0494 
Monrovia, Liberia 186 0/0 0 0.0001 
Stuttgart, Germany 131,050 61/1715 135 0.4655 
Charleston 49,867 0/0 0 0.0296 
Atlanta 82,567 0/0 17 0.0748 
New York 295,200 192/897 129 0.4831 
U.S. Totals  363/8190 8553  
Table 31.   A2 - AFRICOM Strategic Partners 
 
3. A3 - Partner Nation Access 
Sources for partner nation access in Africa have a moderate degree of fidelity, 
more so for locations in the U.S. and Kenya.  Because both North Africa and sub-Saharan 
Africa fall under AFRICOM’s AOR, the AOR percent figures for U.S. cities includes 
those distinct census data that highlight, Moroccan and North African populations.  New 
York leads this sub-factor due to its significant number of formal links to AOR countries 
and its attraction as a major metropolis and port of entry for immigrants (Table 32).   
 
 
                                                 
95 United States, Statistical Abstract of the United States 2009, 128th edition, US Department of 
Commerce, Bureau of Census (Washington, D.C., 2009), 790-793. 
96 Union of International Associations, Yearbook of International Organizations Vol 5, 2006-2007 
(Munchen, 2007), 61-86. 
97 Union of International Associations, Yearbook 2007, 108-117. 
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Kenya is similarly high as indicated by the significant numbers of embassies.  These 
numbers do not account for undocumented immigrant populations which may 





































Kenya 16 0.2353 99.0 0.2653 8 0.2286 0.2382 
Morocco 11 0.1618 98.7 0.2645 2 0.0571 0.1615 
Liberia 2 0.0294 95.0 0.2546 3 0.00857 0.0646 
Germany 10 0.1471 0.40 0.0011 1 0.0286 0.1140 
Charleston 0 0 31.3 0.0838 0 0 0.0105 
Atlanta 7 0.1029 30.5 0.0816 10 0.2857 0.1231 
New York 22 0.3235 18.3 0.0491 11 0.3143 0.2881 
Table 32.   A3 - AFRICOM Partner Nation Access 
 
4. B1 - Utilities 
Utility indicators for AFRICOM come from two main sources, the World Bank 
and the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), Geneva, Switzerland.  Data from 
the World Bank in the World Development Indicators 2008 edition is used to determine 
                                                 
98 Goabroad.com: Embassies and Consulates, www.embassiesabroad.com (accessed 21 February 
2009). 
99 US Cities: www.census.gov (accessed 21 February 2009); international cities: www.cia.gov 
(accessed 21 February 2009). 
100 US Cities: www.census.gov (accessed 21 February 2009). International cities: www.cia.gov 
(accessed 21 February 2009); www.epodunk.com (accessed 21 February 2009); 
Kenyaembassy.com\diaspora (accessed 21 February 2009); Morrocancongress.org (accessed 21 February 
2009); nationmaster.com (accessed 21 February 2009).  
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the water and sanitation values and is focused on the urban environment.  
Communication architecture development is provided by the ITU Information and 
Communication Technology statistics webpage.  This website provided statistics for all 
locations under consideration and provides a broader picture of the communication 
architecture in each city.     
The World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI) provides data on energy 
reliability for only two of the seven locations as a measurement of the percentage of the 
total population with access to electricity.  Data was not provided for Germany, Liberia, 
or the United States.  Specific values are provided for the total population and these are 
therefore likely skewed lower due to the fact that a command will be located in an urban 
setting where electricity availability is certainly higher.  Because of the lack of precise 
data, energy reliability norms will be determined through quantitative analysis using 
available WDI reliability numbers and net energy imports in concert with a quantitative 
review.   
Due to the size of the pairwise comparison matrix (seven by seven or 42 direct 
comparisons), only significant comparisons are highlighted.  The remainders are provided 
in Table 33. The World Bank does not provide total reliability percentages for Germany 
or the United States.  However, the author assumes 100 percent availability for both 
locations based on the fact that commands in these locations currently function with 100 
percent availability.  With this assumption and a thirty percent energy import rating, U.S. 
locations are rated a value of 2 (weak importance) over Germany.  Kenya and Morocco 
are the only cities with both data points for energy reliability.  Due to its greater percent 
in total access, Morocco is rated as 4 (moderate plus) over Kenya. Liberia is the only 
country where neither energy indicator is available.  It is the least capable of the seven 
locations in providing energy as a result of its recent history of conflict.  While President 
Johnson-Sirleaf has made progress in stabilizing the country, the infrastructure and 
development of energy is lagging.  This will require a significant amount of development 
and time to achieve a level of power generation necessary to support the country and 
additionally the command.   
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Kenya 1 1/4 3 1/5 1/6 1/6 1/6 0.0367 
Morocco 4 1 5 1/4 1/5 1/5 1/5 0.0689 
Liberia 1/3 1/5 1 1/7 1/8 1/8 1/8 0.0217 
Germany 5 4 7 1 1/2 1/2 1/2 0.1529 
Charleston 6 5 8 2 1 1 1 0.2400 
Atlanta 6 5 8 2 1 1 1 0.2400 
New York 6 5 8 2 1 1 1 0.2400 
Table 33.   AFRICOM Energy Pairwise Comparison 
 



























Nairobi 83/46 0.0673 0.7/30.2/8.0 0.0305 8%/19% 0.0367 0.0448 
Rabat 99/88 0.1288 7.7/64.2/21.1 0.0778 71%/93% 0.0689 0.0918 
Monrovia 72/49 0.0717 0.1/15.0/0.5 0.0111 ND/ND 0.0217 0.0348 
Stuttgart 100/100 0.1464 65.1/117.6/72.0 0.2502 ND/61 0.1529 0.1832 
Charleston 100/100 0.1464 53.4/83.5/72.5 0.2102 ND/30 0.2400 0.1989 
Atlanta 100/100 0.1464 53.4/83.5/72.5 0.2102 ND/30 0.2400 0.1989 
New York 100/100 0.1464 53.4/83.5/72.5 0.2102 ND/30 0.2400 0.1989 
Table 34.   B1 - AFRICOM Utilities Site Values 
                                                 
101 World Bank, World Development Indicators: 2008 (Washington DC, World Bank, 2008), 98-101, 
146-149. 
102 International Telecommunication Union, www.itu.int/itu-d/icteye/indicators/indicators.aspx 
(accessed 28 February 2009). 
103 World Bank, World Development Indicators 2004 (Washington DC, World Bank, 2004), 148-151 
104 World Bank, WDI 2008, 158-161. 
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5. B2 - Transportation 
The data analysis gives New York a significant advantage in the transportation 
arena.  Atlanta and Stuttgart follow distantly (Table 35).   Air transport data is biased 
toward direct transport between the U.S. and the potential location.  It does not account 
for passengers or cargo that transfers in transit to different airlines at intermediate airports 
such as Amsterdam (e.g., Kenyan Airlines to KLM).   
 
























Nairobi 0 0 0 0 380.4108 0.0480 0.0160 
Rabat 118 0.0025 2.2 0.0011 561 0.0707 0.0248 
Monrovia 0 0 0 0 30109 0.0038 0.0013 
Stuttgart 6766 0.1419 476.4 0.2345 87110 0.0110 0.1291 
Charleston 1.8 0 28.2 0.0139 1,488 0.1876 0.0672 
Atlanta 8756 0.1836 290.6 0.1430 1,574 0.1984 0.1750 
New York 32,051 0.6720 1,234.1 0.6075 3,811 0.4805 0.5867 
Table 35.   B2 - AFRICOM Transportation Site Factors 
                                                 
105 DOT,  “U.S. International Air Passenger and Freight Statistics Report,” 
http://ostpxweb.dot.gov/aviation/usstatreport.htm (accessed 2 March 2009), reports used 2008, 2007, and 
2006 for passenger statistics. 
106 DOT,  “U.S. International Air Passenger and Freight Statistics Report.” 
107 World Bank WDI 2008, 300-303; United States, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 
2009,128th Edition Washington, D.C. 2008), 661. Additional data is provided as noted. 
108 Sean Gibson, 2005. Ports and Terminals Guide 2005-2006. Redhill, Surrey [etc.]: Lloyd’s 
Register - Fairplay, 2-1133. 
109 Gibson, Ports and Terminals Guide, 2-1223. 
110 Gibson, Ports and Terminals Guide, 2-344-352.  This data includes the ports of Karlsruhe and 
Mannheim-Ludwigshafen which are in geographic proximity to Stuttgart. 
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6. B3 - Cost of Living 
U.S. cities urban areas measure relative price levels of consumer goods and 
services for mid-management standards of living comparing prices at a single point in 
time.  State Department living costs abroad are comparisons of goods and services 
between overseas posts and Washington, D.C.  This comparison is used to establish a 
relative weight between foreign locations and U.S. locations in broad terms.  Both 
sources provide data meant for comparison at a single point in time, January 2007.  
Values for cost of living are inverted because a lower value is better; inverting the value 
results in a higher value mathematically for use in the model.  Therefore, Atlanta and 
Charleston with the lower two values have higher site values for the final calculations. 
 
B3 - Cost of Living Cost of Living Relative to 
Washington D.C. 111 
Inverse 
(1/B3) 
B3 Site Values (Ti/ΣTi) 
Nairobi 1.2700 0.7874 0.1198 
Rabat 1.3800 0.7246 0.1102 
Monrovia 1.3500 0.7407 0.1127 
Stuttgart 1.4600 0.6849 0.1042 
Charleston 0.7068 1.4149 0.2152 
Atlanta 0.6888 1.4519 0.2208 
New York 1.2994 0.7696 0.1171 
Table 36.   B3 - AFRICOM Cost of Living Site Data 
 
                                                 
111 United States Department of State Bureau of Administration Office of Allowances,  “Indexes of 
Living Costs Abroad, Quarters Allowances, and Hardship Differentials January 2007,” 2-6.   “Statistical 
Abstract of the United States 2008: The National Data Book” (Bernan Assoc. (2008), 473-475.  Stuttgart 
data provided is from Frankfurt A.M., the nearest listed city to Stuttgart Both values measure the cost of 
representative goods and services and a ration determined using Washington, D.C. as the common 
denominator.  
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7. C - Local Environment 
The United States received consistent scores of 1 for political rights (PR) and civil 
liberties (CL) from 1993 to 2008.  During this time the U.S. has changed control of the 
executive and legislative branches twice.  During these election periods, political rhetoric 
has been heated at times; however, no violence has been experienced.  The two dominant 
political parties continue to debate several issues such as immigration, the economic 
crisis, and infringement on civil rights as a result of the Patriot Act.  U.S. political 
stability is solid despite the heated debates on these issues.  Minority populations in the 
U.S. are expanding and gaining influence on policy and civil rights matters.   The U.S. 
continues to enjoy peaceful transitions of power. 
Figure 6 shows the trend for Kenya’s Freedom House scores.  Kenya has had a 
status of not free for the majority of this time period until 2002 when it improved to 
partly free where its overall status remains.  During this time frame, Freedom House 
scores have increased and decreased on a generally improving trend.  Political 
development in Kenya has been marked by violence and oppression during this time, 
particularly in the 1990s.  In the early 2000s, peaceful expectations rose; however, daily 
events and elections continued to be marred corruption.  2005 witnessed the acceptance 
of a new constitution, yet corruption allegations surfaced in 2006 at high levels in the 
government.  During the 2007 elections, the situation appeared to be set for a change in 
government as the opposition appeared to be gaining ground.  Flawed elections set the 
stage for violence that erupted between opposition and ruling party ethnic bases, 
threatening political stability and raising concerns about genocide.  However, Kenya 
appears to have returned to a status quo ante, though latent tensions certainly remain.   
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Figure 6.   Kenya Freedom House 15-Year Graph 
 
Morocco is at a significant juncture in its political development.  It has been 
steady in the 5/4 to 5/5 range since 1993.  The enthronement of King Mohammed VI 
upon the death of his father in 1999 raised expectations for improved political and civil 
rights.  The young king has opened, but more slowly than observers had hoped.  Power 
still rests with the king, although parliamentary representation by popular vote continues 
to improve.  Civil liberties have improved faster than political rights.  The government 
continues to monitor extremist religious groups and journalists, among others, which 
result in police action and self-censorship.  As Morocco gains more freedom, instability 
and insecurity may increase.   






























Figure 7.   Morocco Freedom House 15-Year Graph 
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Liberia shows the most changes and therefore unpredictability in PR/CL scores 
during this timeframe.  The country has experienced civil war, followed by increased 
stability, followed by reversion to war, and yet another period of increased stability 
following the election of President Johnson-Sirleaf with the support of a large UN 
peacekeeping presence.  Liberia’s most infamous personality, Charles Taylor, is on trial 
or war crimes in The Hague.  President Johnson-Sirleaf has attempted in address the 
corruption endemic in the country and establishes a basis for rapid political development 
and infrastructure improvement; much of which relies on the assistance of outside 
benefactors.112  Many of the underlying factors that aggravated the conflict during 
Taylor’s reign still remain, such as ethnic conflict and the  “culture of corruption.”  
Significant work remains before Liberia can be considered a stable and supportive 
location. 




























Figure 8.   Liberia Freedom House 15-Year Graph 
Germany is a stable country capable of hosting a combatant command.  Its 
Freedom House scores of 2/1 indicate it promotes political rights and civil liberties 
expected in a free society.  Germany has experienced minor political violence since 1993.  
Political parties have significant freedom within extreme boundaries with extremist 
parties on either side of the political spectrum being legally restricted.   
                                                 
112 Freedom House Online, Liberia 2008 Overview, 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22&year=2008&country=7432 (accessed 28 February 
2009). 
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Figure 9.   Germany Freedom House 15-Year Graph 
Three essential sub-groups break out in the final Local Environment site values. 
The first group, the United States cities and Stuttgart are identical in their stability and 
security and are rated 1 (equal importance) by pairwise comparison with each other.  The 
next sub-grouping is Kenya and Morocco, each experiencing low levels of violence in 
recent years.  Kenya receives a higher rating based on its greater freedoms and greater 
experience with democracy, despite recent political violence.  It is rated as 3 (moderate) 
vis a vis Morocco.  The first group is rated 5 (strong) to 6 (very strong) versus the second 
group.  Liberia is in a class of its own based largely on its unpredictability.  Despite the 
same scores as Kenya, it has had a significantly more volatile road during the last 15 
years with significant changes twice during this timeframe whereas Kenya has been 
generally steady and is rated as 4 (moderate plus) over Liberia.  By comparison, Liberia 
receives better Freedom House scores than Morocco, but Morocco has shown greater 










Kenya 1 3 4 1/5 1/5 1/5 1/5 0.0606 
Morocco 1/3 1 2 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 0.0347 
Liberia 1/4 1/2 1 1/8 1/8 1/8 1/8 0.0232 
Germany 5 6 8 1 1 1 1 0.2204 
Charleston 5 6 8 1 1 1 1 0.2204 
Atlanta 5 6 8 1 1 1 1 0.2204 
New York 5 6 8 1 1 1 1 0.2204 
Table 37.   C - AFRICOM Local Environment Site Values 
 
8. AFRICOM Composite Scores 
New York is clearly the strongest contender of potential sites to host AFRICOM 
when all requirements of a combatant command are considered.  It leads in the strategic 
access factor enabling the command to have greater access to USG and strategic partners, 
than any of the other contending sites by a large margin.  Based on the number of 
consulates and embassies in New York, it has strong formal relations with which to 
engage partner governments.  Its infrastructure is highly diverse and capable of 
supporting the command; however, it is the most costly place to live in the U.S.   Atlanta 
offers the next greatest level of capabilities followed closely by Stuttgart.   
According to this analysis, the command should not be positioned on the 
continent of Africa.  African locations do not offer the USG access or supporting 
infrastructure necessary to attract and enable the command to function at the strategic 
level.  Indeed, African locations are only competitive with non-African locations for 
regional nation engagement factor.  Given that the command requires greater access and 
support in which to execute its mission, the composite indicators point to New York as 
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0.2970 0.0180 0.0103 0.0069 0.0655 0.0655 0.0655 0.0655 
Score = 
ΣwixrijSiteY 
 0.0955 0.0632 0.0275 0.1940 0.1011 0.2087 0.3287 
Table 38.   AFRICOM Final Values 
 
C. CONCLUSION 
AFRICOM’s final location decision requires focused, dedicated analysis to ensure 
its location allows the command to perform.  The final location must enable and enhance 
its performance at the strategic level, operational level considerations are best addressed 
through its components which require separate analyses as their factors will be focused 
on different requirements.  Initial decisions were optimistic that the welcome mat would 
be opened and location statements were published too early in the process.  In 
AFRICOM’s short history; it has retreated from initial statements that indicated a 
continental location was a must in order for it to succeed, to establishing a temporary 
headquarters in Stuttgart due to resistance from African nations, and finally, commitment 
to a thorough analysis of potential locations, U.S. or otherwise.  The final decision has 
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been put off until 2012.  This timeframe allows for a methodical approach to determine 
the best manner in which to approach this decision.  The model presented in this thesis 
provides a solid, analytical tool for that purpose.  As indicated by Yang and Lee and the 
business community, the success of a headquarters relies heavily on its location.  This 
decision is complex and has a large number of variables to consider.  The differences 
between the business and military communities have been taken into account by this 
model and refocused to address the unique military and governmental requirements.  
DoD has utilized business practices and tools to become more efficient.  An important 
decision such as the location of its newest combatant command should be no different 
and utilize tools that enable these decisions.  The command’s performance is not about 
the bottom line of profit, but the bottom line of strategy and policy development with the 
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